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The deadly attack at Fort Lauderdale airport earlier this month by an indi-
vidual claiming to have been influenced by voices he heard and to have 
acted on behalf of the Islamic State has renewed attention on the nexus 
between terrorism and mental health. In our cover article, Emily Corner and Paul Gill explore what 
they argue are complex and often misunderstood links. Their preliminary findings show that the 
proportion of attackers in the West possibly influenced by the Islamic State with a history of psycho-
logical instability is about the same as the rate of such instability in the general population, though 
the rate is higher than in the general population if Islamic State-directed attacks are excluded. This is 
in line with their previous findings that group-based terrorists are much less likely to have mental 
disorders than lone-actor terrorists. They also question the degree to which lone-actor terrorists with 
mental disorders are symptomatic at the time of attacks. Lone-actor terrorists with mental disorders, 
they have found, are just as likely to engage in rational planning prior to attacks as those without. 
Their research has also found a significantly higher rate of schizophrenia among lone-actor terrorists 
than in the general population. There is a long-running debate about whether this condition could 
make individuals of all ideological persuasions less inhibited in moving from radical thought to rad-
ical action.
In a joint interview, Peter Edge, Acting Deputy Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs En-
forcement, and Wil Van Gemert, Deputy Director of Europol, focus on the challenges of identifying, 
tracking, and interdicting foreign terrorist fighters and steps being taken to deepen transatlantic 
cooperation. Michael Horton argues that AQAP’s deepening ties to anti-Houthi forces in Yemen’s 
civil war is making the terrorist group even more resilient and difficult to combat. Don Rassler exam-
ines the contest between the United States and jihadis on drones and drone countermeasures. Jason 
Warner looks at the three newly self-declared affiliates of the Islamic State in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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The wave of Islamic State-linked terrorism experienced in 
the West over the past couple of years has rekindled debates 
surrounding mental disorders and terrorist engagement. 
A very preliminary survey by the authors found that out of 
55 attacks in the West where the 76 individuals involved 
were possibly influenced by the Islamic State, according 
to media reports, 27.6% had a history of apparent 
psychological instability, a percentage comparable to that 
found in the general population. This figure is driven largely 
by individuals inspired by the Islamic State, as opposed 
to those directed by it, however. The percentage is likely 
overinflated for several noteworthy reasons, including 
poor reporting, low benchmarks, and the tendency 
to overuse mental health problems as a ‘silver-bullet’ 
explanation for terrorist involvement. The relationship 
is, in fact, far more complex than typically presented.
T he Islamic State-linked terrorism experienced in the West recently has reignited debates about the con-nection between mental disorders in terrorist activ-ity. Indeed, the assistant commissioner for specialist operations in London’s Metropolitan Police Service 
acknowledges the Islamic State is actively trying to recruit, among 
others, “those with mental health issues.”1 Similarly, Australia’s na-
tional counterterrorism coordinator, Greg Moriarty, has outlined 
that many cases involve individuals “not necessarily deeply com-
mitted to and engaged with the Islamist ideology but are none-
theless, due to a range of reasons, including mental health issues, 
susceptible to being motivated and lured rapidly down a dangerous 
path by the terrorist narrative.”2 The debates became particularly 
salient through the summer of 2016 when lone actors inspired and 
encouraged by the Islamic State killed 135 civilians in separate at-
tacks in Orlando and Nice. More recently, the fatal shooting of five 
individuals at Fort Lauderdale airport added complexity to these 
debates. All perpetrators had reported histories of mental disorder. 
This article seeks to answer several questions to provide a more 
rigorous evidence base for these debates. These questions include: 
What is the existing evidence base regarding psychopathology and 
terrorist involvement? How prevalent are mental disorders among 
Islamic State-directed and -inspired offenders in the West? What 
is the content of these diagnoses? When present, what relationship 
did the disorder have with radicalization?
The Evidence Base
Very few scientific analyses have focused upon the relationship 
between mental health and terrorist involvement. The following 
outlines the headline results from the sum total of these scientific 
endeavors.3 Some recent studies analyzed the prevalence rates of 
different disorders within very different samples of terrorist offend-
ers. Based on police files, 6% of Anton Weenink’s sample of 140 
Dutch individuals who either became foreign fighters or sought to 
travel abroad for the purpose of terrorism had diagnosed disorders.4 
An additional 20% displayed signs of undiagnosed mental health 
problems. The diagnoses included ADD, AD/HD, autism spectrum, 
narcissistic, schizophrenia, post-traumatic stress, and psychotic dis-
orders. The prevalence of schizophrenia (2%) in the sample was 
higher than what would be expected in the general population, 
which is currently estimated at between 0.87% and 1%.5
A study of lone-actor terrorists co-authored by the authors of 
this article also found higher rates of schizophrenia than in the gen-
eral population, as well as certain other disorders. Based on open 
source information, over 40% of Emily Corner, Paul Gill, and Oliver 
Mason’s study6 of 153 lone-actor, solo-actor, and dyad terroristsa 
had a diagnosed disorder, much higher than in the general pop-
a A lone-actor terrorist is defined by John Horgan, Paul Gill, Noemie 
Bouhana, James Silver, and Emily Corner as “an individual lacking any 
ties to a terrorist/violent extremist group … These individuals typically 
engage in violence in support of a group and/or ideology.” Lone actors 
within the sample included those inspired by Islamist, right-wing, left-
wing, nationalist, and single issue ideologies. John Horgan, Paul Gill, 
Noemie Bouhana, James Silver, and Emily Corner, “Across the universe? A 
comparative analysis of violent radicalization across three offender types 
with implications for criminal justice training and education,” National 
Institute of Justice, June 2016. A “solo-actor terrorist” is defined as “an 
individual who either (a) carried out the act of terror alone, but under 
instruction or (b) carries out the act through his/her own volition, but has 
had previous contact with terrorist/violent extremist groups and/or radical 
environments to receive planning and support.” John Horgan et al. A dyad 
in this context refers to two individuals who conceive, plan, and carry out 
an attack on their own. One or both individuals may have previously been 
attached to a terrorist group.
Emily Corner is a research associate at the University College 
London’s Department of Security and Crime Science. She is cur-
rently working on a European Union-funded project on lone-actor 
terrorists.
Paul  Gill  is a senior lecturer at the University College London’s 
Department of Security and Crime Science. He is currently work-
ing on projects on decision-making and lone-actor terrorism that 
are funded by CREST, the European Union, and Minerva. 
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ulation (25-27%).b The diagnoses included schizophrenia (8.5%), 
depression (7.2%), unspecified personality disorder (6.5%), bipolar 
disorder (3.9%), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD, 3.3%), au-
tism spectrum disorder (3.3%), delusional disorder (2.0%), unspec-
ified anxiety disorder (1.3%), traumatic brain injury (TBI, 1.3%), 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD, 1.3%), unspecified sleep dis-
order (0.7%), schizoaffective disorder (0.7%), psychotic disorder 
(0.7%), drug dependence (0.7%), and dissociative disorder (0.7%).c 
Three disorders held a substantially higher prevalence than found 
within general populations (schizophrenia, delusional disorder, and 
autism spectrum disorders), whereas depression, anxiety, PTSD, 
and sleep disorders are more commonly found within the general 
population than the lone-actor sample.7
Michael and Simon Gottschalk8 also tested rates of various mea-
sures of personality and psychopathology within terrorist samples 
against the civilian population. By administering the MMPI-2,d 
they compared 90 incarcerated Palestinian and Israeli terrorists to 
control groups of Palestinians and Israeli Jews matched on demo-
graphic features. The former group scored higher on subscale mea-
sures of psychopathic deviate, paranoid, depressive, schizophrenic, 
and hypomanic tendencies.
It is worth remembering, however, that the Weenink study and 
the Corner, Gill, and Mason study are based on small samples of 
particular terrorist types and not necessarily a depiction of all ter-
rorist populations globally. Evidence suggests, for example, that 
the rates of mental disorders within lone-actor terrorist popula-
tions are significantly higher than group-based terrorists. Corner, 
Gill, and Mason9 found a negative correlation between the level of 
co-offending and the rate of mental disorder prevalence. Whereas 
40% of the study’s lone-actor terrorists had a mental disorder, the 
prevalence rates were lower for solo-actor terrorists at around 20%, 
just over 5% for terrorist dyads, and less than 3% for terrorist group 
members.e In an earlier study, Corner and Gill found that lone-actor 
terrorists were 13.5 times more likely to have a mental disorder than 
b A large-scale worldwide epidemiological investigation based on the 
International Classification of Diseases (ICD) diagnostic tool highlighted 
that the average prevalence for a diagnosis of any disorder is 27.43%. 
Ronald Kessler and Bedirhan Üstün, The WHO world mental health surveys: 
Global perspectives on the epidemiology of mental disorders (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2008). Whereas a worldwide study utilizing 
the Diagnostic and Statisticians Manual (DSM) as a diagnostic tool 
identified a lifetime prevalence of 25.0%. Jordi Alonso et al., “Prevalence 
of Mental Disorders in Europe: Results from the European Study of the 
Epidemiology of Mental Disorders (ESEMeD) Project,” Acta Psychiatrica 
Scandinavica 109 (2004): pp. 21-22. 
c The cases were based on information found in open source accounts, 
including court documents. Diagnoses were confirmed through extensive 
cross-checking of sources. Court decisions were deemed most reliable, but 
in some cases, mental health status was not argued at trial as the individual 
had an established history.
d Developed from the MMPI by James Neal Butcher, it is utilized by mental 
health professionals to clinically assess personality traits and mental 
health problems. James Neal Butcher, “Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory (MMPI), International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral 
Sciences (1989): pp. 9,891-9,894.
e An individual in a group (three or more individuals) involved in or intent on 
carrying out acts of terrorism. This database consists of 544 actors, with 
links to 85 designated terror organizations. (Cross checked with Terrorism 
Research & Analysis Consortium, Global Terrorism Database, and the U.S. 
Department of State’s list of terrorist designations and state sponsors of 
terrorism).
group-based terrorists.10 This result was in line with Christopher 
Hewitt’s analysis of U.S.-based terrorists who espoused a range of 
ideologies (22% vs. 8.1%),11 and that of Jeff Gruenewald, Steven 
Chermak, and Joshua Freilich, who examined U.S.-based, far-right 
offenders (40.4% vs. 7.6%).
Evidence also suggests that some terrorist roles may be more 
likely to experience particular mental disorders. Ariel Merari 
and his colleagues carried out psychological tests on samples of 
suicide bombers and various control groups (e.g. other terrorists 
and non-political criminals)12 employing a range of techniques 
including clinical interviews, personality tests, the Thematic Ap-
perception Test, and the House-Tree-Person Drawing test. Suicide 
bombers obtained significantly more diagnoses of Avoidant-De-
pendent Personality Disorder (60% vs. 17%), depressive symptoms 
(53% vs. 8%) and more readily displayed suicidal tendencies (40% 
vs. 0%). On the other hand, the control group was more likely to 
contain members with psychopathic tendencies (25% vs. 0%) and 
impulsive-unstable tendencies (67% vs. 27%). Suicide bomber or-
ganizers scored higher in ego-strength, impulsivity, and emotional 
instability than would-be suicide bombers. 
Collectively, these results provide important insight into how we 
should try to understand Islamic State-linked cases. We should ex-
pect to see higher rates of specific mental disorders among lone-ac-
tors than the general population, and we should expect variance 
across the roles and behaviors that these individuals engage in once 
they have chosen to turn to violence (e.g. suicide attack vs. non-sui-
cide attack). We may also expect to find higher rates of disorders 
among lone actors inspired and encouraged versus those who are 
directly trained and dispatched by the Islamic State. 
The Circumstantial Evidence Base
Whereas the above studies meticulously collected data and com-
pared the terrorist samples to wider comparison or control groups, 
no such studies exist on Islamic State-linked plotters in the West. 
Some insight may come from a couple of studies on al-Qa`ida-in-
spired or -directed terrorism in the 1990s and 2000s to provide 
a useful framework for trying to understand the current security 
problem. Marc Sageman’s seminal study of al-Qa`ida networks 
downplayed the presence of mental disorder. His first study of 
172 individuals highlighted one case of “probable mild mental re-
tardation or borderline intellectual functioning” and two cases of 
“psychotic disorders.” Sageman notes this is “about the incidence 
of these disorders in the general population.”13 In Sageman’s up-
dated analysis of around 500 individuals, “there were about four 
with hints that they experienced beliefs that were not based in re-
ality,” but there was “little evidence for any personality disorder.”14 
It should be noted, however, that these figures may be a function of 
the actors being largely network-based. The current threat is more 
varied with a higher propensity for lone actors, so we may also ex-
pect the presence of mental disorders to differ. It may be better to 
focus on al-Qa`ida inspired lone-actors for insight. In Paul Gill, 
John Horgan, and Paige Deckert’s study of 119 lone-actor terror-
ists, 43% were al-Qa`ida-inspired. Of this sub-sample, 25% had 
a diagnosed mental disorder, which is essentially the same as the 
population base rate. This figure, however, was significantly lower 
than those lone actors inspired by single-issue causes (52%) such as 
anti-abortion, environmentalism, and animal rights.15 
In preparing this article, the authors looked at 55 attacks (total-
ing 76 individuals) between May 1, 2014, and September 30, 2016, 
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where media reports indicated they were possibly influenced in 
some way by the Islamic State.f (See appendix). These cases encom-
pass both Islamic State-inspired attacks and Islamic State-directed 
attacks as well as attacks enabled by communications with Islamic 
State operatives who provided guidance to attackers without them 
ever connecting to the group in person.g And they include both 
confirmed Islamists and troubled individuals with unconfirmed 
ideological commitment to Islamist causes who may just have been 
influenced by the group’s calls to violence. A history of psycholog-
ical instabilityh was noted in 21 (27.6%) of the individuals. This is 
broadly comparable to the current worldwide average (25-27%). 
The authors were not able to find examples of psychological insta-
bility in the media reporting on those alleged to have taken part 
in Islamic State directed attacks (for example, the November 2015 
Paris attacks and the March 2016 Brussels attacks). Excluding Is-
lamic State-directed plots, the percentage of attackers with reported 
psychological instability was 34.4%.
It is worth noting that some of those with overt mental health 
problems may not have been inspired by the Islamic State but were 
simply professing Allahu akbar because it is well recognized as a 
phrase used in violent attacks. As these cases were dismissed as not 
being terrorism, there was barely any (in many cases no) further 
media reporting as to the individual’s intentions, and therefore, 
the degree to which they were truly Islamic State inspired is not 
currently known.
These are extremely preliminary results.i There are several prac-
tical constraints to a full-blown study akin to Sageman’s at this mo-
ment. On a very basic level, it is difficult to put a true figure on the 
prevalence rates simply because the vast majority of cases have yet 
to be examined in a court of law. If one thinks about the reliability 
of sources on a credibility continuum with trial evidence on the 
f Cases were chosen following expansive searches of multiple open 
source outlets, using the LexisNexis open source archive of academic 
and media articles as a starting point. Cases were determined to be 
“possibly influenced” by the Islamic State following cross-referencing of 
information. The authors did not include cases where media reporting 
indicated inspiration came from Islamist terrorist groups other than the 
Islamic State, such as the July 2015 Chattanooga, Tennessee, attack. See 
Devlin Barret and Arian Campo-Flores, “Investigators See Radicalization in 
Chattanooga Shooter,” Wall Street Journal, July 21, 2015. 
g By “Islamic State-directed” attacks, the authors mean attacks involving 
Islamic State fighters recruited in person into the group and tasked by the 
group to launch attacks. 
h The threshold the authors used for determining psychological instability 
was individuals reported to have had a history of psychiatric or 
psychological intervention for perceived mental problems or mental health 
interventions and/or diagnoses after their attacks. Cases in which family 
members reported depression or erratic behavior or mental health issues 
that did not result in such interventions were not included. For example, 
Orlando nightclub shooter Omar Mateen was not classed as having 
psychological instability because although his former wife told reporters he 
was “mentally ill,” the authors were not able to find any evidence there was 
any mental health intervention. Greg Toppo, “Ex-wife: Orlando shooter ‘very 
short-tempered,’ violent,” USA Today, June 12, 2016. 
i These results differ from the earlier work of the authors, where more 
comprehensive cases, particularly regarding mental health status, could be 
formed. The cases of Corner and Gill (2015), and Corner, Gill, and Mason 
(2016) were drawn from individuals who had either been convicted of a 
terrorist act or died in the commission of their offense. The large majority 
of Islamic State-linked cases referenced in this article have not reached 
trial stage, and there is therefore less concrete information to draw from 
and analyze.
highest end, the vast majority of cases are still reliant on sources 
from the lower end.
When dealing solely with this lower end, researchers need to be 
careful of a number of potential pitfalls. Many high-profile, Islamic 
State-inspired individuals have undoubtedly either shown symp-
toms of psychological distress in earlier years or have been formally 
diagnosed with a disorder. However, at a time when rigorous and 
interdisciplinary insight was needed, many researchers, reporters, 
and practitioners turned to flippant language and coinage. Such 
phrases not only failed to explain the relationship (if any) between 
terrorist engagement and psychopathology but also potentially 
stigmatized the infinitesimally greater number of individuals suf-
fering from some form of mental disorder with absolutely no hint 
of radicalization or plans to engage in violence. These include Max 
Abrahms’ “loon wolf ”16 phrase, a term that he applies to any lone 
terrorist suffering any form of mental disorder or psychological dis-
tress. The “loon” connotation also implies crazy or deranged and 
misses the fact that rational planning often occurs in the presence 
of a mental disorder. 
Corner and Gill17 (these authors) empirically compared a sam-
ple of lone-actor terrorists with mental disorders with a sample of 
lone-actor terrorists without mental disorders. They found that 
those with a mental disorder were just as (and in some cases more) 
likely to engage in a range of rational pre-attack behaviors as those 
who were not. Offenders with mental disorders were more likely to 
express violent desires, seek legitimization for their intended ac-
tions, stockpile weapons, train, carry out a successful attack, kill 
and injure, discriminate in their targeting, and claim responsibility. 
Most of these traits are typically viewed as rational behaviors to 
achieve terrorism goals. 
Other popular terms used on Twitter are “Islamopsychotics” and 
“Mentalhadist,” terms that conflate religious devotion with mental 
illness, thus simplifying and demonizing both.18 Such conceptually 
loose and boundary-less terms may have the impact of also inflating 
perceptions of the prevalence of mental disorders (which have a 
very strict set of operationalized and bounded criteria). 
A second obvious problem with this lower end of the credibility 
continuum is that the sources are sometimes highly questionable. 
Again, this may artificially inflate the true prevalence rate. In many 
cases, anonymous sources allude to the individual’s (usually unspec-
ified) strange and erratic behaviors prior to their radicalization. It 
is often implied and assumed that this is related to mental health 
problems, but the reporting is unspecific. For example, on Septem-
ber 23, 2014, Numan Haider stabbed and injured two counterter-
rorism officers in the parking lot of a police station in Melbourne, 
Australia. Haider was shot dead at the scene. There is evidence that 
his family previously encouraged him to seek help from a counsel-
or for erratic behavior.19 However, this was most likely linked to 
their worries over his potential radicalization rather than mental 
health issues.20 Other cases reporting “erratic behavior” include Mi-
chael Zehaf-Bibeau (the Parliament of Canada shooter) and Zale 
Thompson (who attacked four New York City police officers with a 
hatchet). All three examples fall short of a confirmed mental health 
diagnosis of any sort. All three, however, have been held up as irre-
futable evidence of the link between mental health problems and 
radicalization. The bar for confirming evidence should be higher 
within research and practitioner communities.
Other cases highlight instances where mental health problems 
were alluded to by non-experts (often family, friends, neighbors) but 
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latched onto by the wider media as concrete evidence of a disorder’s 
presence (and presumably direct role in the violent intent/actions). 
Worryingly, now that concrete empirical evidence has demonstrat-
ed the greater propensity for lone-actor terrorists to have a mental 
health problem, it is often one of the first lines of investigation in 
media reporting. The below examples, while interesting, show the 
disturbingly low levels of evidence provided within some reporting 
that depicts the individual as having a mental disorder. Such report-
ing has potentially overinflated the true rates. 
On October 20, 2014, Martin Couture-Rouleau, a 25-year-old 
French Canadian who converted to Islam in 2013, deliberately 
rammed his car into two Canadian Armed Forces soldiers in a shop-
ping center parking lot in Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec, Can-
ada. One soldier was killed. Couture-Rouleau was shot following 
a chase and altercation with a female police officer. No confirmed 
diagnoses exist, but neighbors claim he was “depressed,” and one 
additional source claimed Couture-Rouleau’s father had previously 
attempted unsuccessfully to admit him to psychiatric care.21 
On January 7, 2016, Edward Archer shot and wounded a police 
officer in Philadelphia. When apprehended, Archer confessed that 
he committed the attack in the name of Islam and pledged alle-
giance to the Islamic State. Archer’s mother claimed that he had 
sustained a traumatic head injury from a moped accident and that 
he had “some form” of mental illness because “he’s been talking 
to himself … laughing and mumbling” and “hearing voices in his 
head.”22
On June 12, 2016, Omar Mateen, a 29-year-old American cit-
izen of Afghan descent, attacked the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, 
Florida, killing 49 individuals. Mateen was shot and killed by law 
enforcement following an extended standoff. Mateen had a history 
of disruptive behavior while at school. When Mateen applied for his 
security guard’s license in 2007 and its renewal in 2013, no psycho-
logical issues were noted at screening. Mateen was a habitual user 
of steroids, and his first wife claimed that he was “mentally unsta-
ble and mentally ill.”23 There is no further evidence to support this 
claim, however. Confusion remains over Mateen’s exact motives, as 
he pledged allegiance to the Islamic State just prior to this attack 
over the phone. Multiple witnesses have also claimed that Mateen 
was homosexual and struggled to come to terms with his sexuality.24
Other cases are complicated by continuing questions over the 
degree of psychological distress and other vulnerabilities. On July 
24, 2016, Mohammad Daleel, a 27-year-old Syrian refugee, carried 
out a suicide bombing in Ansbach, Germany. Only the assailant was 
killed. Investigators believe he had planned to detonate the device 
remotely, was planning follow-on attacks, and his death was an ac-
cident.25 Daleel, who had been treated by a trauma therapist who 
warned he might engage in a “spectacular” suicide attempt,26 twice 
was reported as attempting suicide following failed asylum applica-
tions in Germany, after which his deportation was stalled.27 Eleven 
days before the bombing, Daleel was again served a deportation 
order. Given the Islamic State’s claim that he was previously part of 
the group in Syria28 and detailed instructions he was receiving in 
communication with a suspected Islamic State handler overseas,29 
some have pointed to the possibility that he might have exaggerated 
his mental health problems to escape deportation.30 As it is difficult 
to determine whether his earlier suicide attempts were used as a 
function to avoid deportation or due to underlying distress, it is 
difficult to disentangle these actions from the form of violence he 
ultimately chose to engage in on behalf of the Islamic State. 
In other cases, specific diagnoses were made but are not public-
ly available. On March 14, 2016, Ayanle Hassan Ali, a 27-year-old 
Canadian, stabbed two soldiers at a recruitment center in Toronto, 
Canada. Following the attack, Ali told officers “Allah told me to do 
this, Allah told me to come here and kill people.” Ali was initially 
deemed unfit to stand trial due to “psychotic symptoms of a major 
mental illness,” but following mandatory treatment, Ali was found 
fit to stand trial for a range of charges.31 
On July 14, 2016, Mohamed Lahouaiej-Bouhlel, a 31-year-old 
Tunisian with French residency, drove a 19-ton cargo truck into a 
crowd of individuals celebrating Bastille Day on the Promenade des 
Anglais, Nice. Lahouaiej-Bouhlel was shot and killed by police after 
he managed to drive over one mile through the crowded streets 
and pedestrian areas. According to reports, Lahouaiej-Bouhlel had 
only started attending a mosque two months prior to the attack.32 
Lahouaiej-Bouhlel’s father claimed that his son had undergone psy-
chiatric treatment prior to 2005 and had a nervous breakdown and 
a history of substance misuse and depression.33
On July 26, 2016, Adel Kermiche and Abdel Malik Petitjean took 
six people captive in the church of Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray, Nor-
mandy, before killing a priest. Kermiche was born in Algeria, and he 
had twice attempted to travel to Syria in 2015 and was jailed.34 The 
attackers were shot and killed when police stormed the church. Fol-
lowing the attack, psychological reports carried out at Kermiche’s 
trial prior to the attack in October 2015 suggested that Kermiche 
had a history of mental health problems.35 This also highlights an 
additional problem: when the offenders die at the scene of the at-
tack, psychiatrists cannot access the offenders to assess their mental 
health. If not for his previous dalliance with the law, Kermiche’s 
mental health issues might have been missed entirely.
The fact is that confirmed diagnoses in recent cases remain few 
and far between. In December 2014, Man Haron Monis, a 50-year-
old Iranian living in Australia, took hostages at the Lindt Cafe in 
Sydney. The siege lasted over 12 hours and ended when security 
officials stormed the cafe and shot Monis. Two others were killed. 
Monis had claimed allegiance with the Islamic State, and following 
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the siege, the Islamic State praised his actions in its propaganda.36 
Monis had an extensive history of mental health issues. Forensic 
psychologist Kate Barrelle, advisor to the coroner in Monis’ case, 
concluded that the attacker suffered from “narcissism, paranoia, 
and antisocial behaviour disorder.” 37 Forensic psychiatrist Jonathan 
Phillips concurred with Barrelle. He dismissed the possibility that 
Monis also suffered from comorbid disorders by explaining that 
earlier non-psychosis-related diagnoses were no different from 
“what everyone experiences ‘from time to time.’” Phillips explained 
that his diagnostic decision was based on Monis’ history of sexu-
al assaults and that he “orchestrated the incident in a meticulous 
and callous manner.”38 Counsel assisting the coroner at the inquest, 
Jeremy Gormly, SC., surmised Phillips’ conclusions: “[Monis] was 
suffering from some definable personality disorders, including an-
ti-social, paranoid and narcissistic tendencies, but did not suffer a 
mental illness and his actions cannot be attributed to mental ill-
ness.”39
On January 7, 2015, Amedy Coulibaly, a French extremist claim-
ing to act on behalf of the Islamic State, shot and wounded a jogger 
in Paris.40 A day later, he is suspected of having killed a French mu-
nicipal police officer. The following day, he murdered four hostages 
at a kosher supermarket. A psychiatrist had previously assessed him 
following earlier criminal behavior and found that Coulibaly had 
an “immature and psychopathic personality” but stopped short of 
diagnosing a specific mental disorder.41 
In December 2015, Muhaydin Mire attacked commuters at Ley-
tonstone underground station in London with a breadknife, injur-
ing three. Mire reportedly claimed, “This is for Syria, my Muslim 
brothers.”42 Mire had a history of mental illness and had spent time 
in psychiatric institutions for delusional and paranoid tendencies 
with some reports of paranoid schizophrenia.43 Mire’s family had 
also sought to have him admitted one month prior to the attack.44
In a recent and complicated case, Esteban Santiago-Ruiz killed 
five and injured another six in a shooting at Fort Lauderdale airport 
in January 2017. Federal officials confirmed that Santiago-Ruiz had 
received psychological treatment. His family members claim that 
his problems stemmed from witnessing two fellow servicemen die 
in combat in Iraq.45 Two months prior to the attack, Santiago-Ruiz 
visited an F.B.I. field office and reported the U.S. government con-
trolled his mind and made him watch Islamic State-related videos. 
The C.I.A. was also forcing him to join the group, according to San-
tiago-Ruiz. After the attack, Santiago-Ruiz initially made similar 
claims. However, after Santiago-Ruiz was transferred to an F.B.I. 
office following the attack, he claimed he carried out the attack on 
behalf of the Islamic State and had not again mentioned mind con-
trol, an F.B.I. agent testified on January 17. Despite Santiago-Ruiz’ 
later claims, the Islamic State are yet to claim responsibility for the 
attack.46 Investigators are continuing to disentangle Santiago-Ruiz’ 
motivation, and whether the attack was motivated by voices in his 
head telling him to commit acts of violence.47 Here, the link between 
mental state and the violence appears to be much clearer than in 
many other cases. However, the depth of his ideological orientation 
toward the Islamic State is highly questionable at the time of writ-
ing. For the authors, he looks far more like other mass murderers 
such as Myron May (the Florida State University shooter), Aaron 
Alexis (the Washington Navy Yard shooter and Jiverly Wong (the 
Binghamton shooter).j All three individuals reported being ‘target-
ed individuals’ and acted violently in order to get the government 
to turn off their mind-control machines. 
In many other cases, when confirmed diagnoses were pres-
ent, there was a tendency to try dismiss the possibility of terror-
ism altogether. For example, on December 21, 2015, an unnamed 
40-year-old ran over 11 pedestrians across the city of Dijon, France, 
while shouting “Allahu akbar,” claiming he was “acting on behalf 
of the children of Palestine,” and brandishing a knife. Police knew 
the assailant for previous minor offenses, and he had spent time 
in psychiatric services. Due to the psychiatric history of the assail-
ant, authorities deemed the attack not to be an act of terrorism.48 
A similar attack that injured 10 in December 2014 in Nantes was 
similarly dismissed as non-terrorism because the individual was 
“unbalanced.”49 On May 10, 2016, an individual attacked commut-
ers with a knife at Grafing train station near Munich. One victim 
died from his wounds. The assailant reportedly shouted “Allahu 
akbar” and continued to espouse similar sentiments such as “all 
infidels must die.” This was later confirmed by police authorities 
but dismissed as terrorism because the individual was “mentally 
disturbed.”50 Moussa Coulibaly’s stabbing of three anti-terrorism 
police officers in Nice in February 2015 was similarly rejected by 
authorities as terrorism because he was viewed as an “unbalanced 
individual.”51 
Nowhere was this debate on whether attacks were terrorism 
or non-politically motivated acts of mentally disturbed individ-
uals more evident than in the Man Haron Monis inquest. Many 
commentators reasoned it was his history of mental disorder that 
best explains his actions and that he should not be considered a 
terrorist. For example, Dr. Rodger Shanahan, a research fellow 
at the Lowy Institute, argued at the inquest that Monis was “not 
motivated by political, ideological or religious causes, but rather 
was someone with mental health issues acting on his own personal 
grudges.”52 Shanahan also argued that “if he [Monis] was following 
IS [Islamic State] direction why didn’t he go in there and kill ev-
eryone?”53 Shanahan instead believed that Monis chose the Lindt 
Cafe for personal rather than political reasons, highlighting Monis’ 
historical grievance with Seven Network’s Sunrise television pro-
gram, whose studios were across the road from the cafe. Shanahan 
also drew on Monis’ lack of direct connection to the Islamic State 
and his wearing of a headband, which has an association with the 
Shi`a sect of Islam and is considered heretical by the Islamic State.54 
Clarke Jones of Australian National University agreed with Shana-
han, explaining that due to his mental health problems, Monis was 
desperate to attach himself to a cause, further explaining that his 
actions were extremely hard to predict.55 Terrorism scholar Bruce 
Hoffman held an opposing view. Monis’ history of mental disorder, 
in Hoffman’s opinion, was “immaterial” as to whether he carried 
out a terrorist attack.56
The debate rests on the question about whether the presence of 
a mental health diagnosis is enough to state that it was a driver of 
the radicalization-linked behavior or whether it was just one ingre-
j Myron May recorded an extensive explanation (1 hr. 47 min. video) of his 
opinion regarding being a targeted individual shortly before carrying out 
the shooting at Florida State University. Within the recording, he refers to 
“other targeted individuals, Aaron Alexis, and Jiverly Wong.” This video was 
uploaded following his attack and death. “The Apprentice of Honor “Myron 
May mind control victim,” YouTube, March 27, 2015.
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dient in the individual’s vulnerability profile and grievance struc-
ture. Some tentative answers are available in the wider research 
literature. 
Corner and Gill57 utilized a sample of 119 lone-actor terrorists 
and investigated whether certain behaviors within the chain of 
events that led to a terrorist attack were more likely to co-occur 
with certain diagnoses than others. Those diagnosed with schizo-
phrenia and associated disorders were the only diagnostic group 
to be significantly associated with previous violent behavior and 
this supports previous research in the general violence literature.58 
This could be linked to the lowering of inhibitions against violence 
or potentially the increased chances the individual had previously 
engaged in (non-terrorist) violence.k Those with personality disor-
ders and autism were less likely to have a spouse/partner involved 
in a terrorist movement, which may be indicative of not having a 
spouse due to the detrimental nature of these disorders. Because 
mental disorders often share symptoms (and because diagnoses 
are often not available), further research may also focus on ana-
lyzing symptoms of mental illness rather than purely the diagno-
ses themselves.59 The results of this investigation offer insight into 
links between specific disorder types, and specific behaviors, that 
in isolation can be linked to a wide range of activities, not just those 
found in a terrorist attack. Researchers are yet to study temporal 
trajectory of behaviors, and how these interact with each other and 
the wider environment in space and time. We just know some be-
haviors co-occurred at some point in the individual’s life-course. 
John Horgan correctly notes that although studies of lone actors 
often find high preponderance of mental health issues within the 
sample, “detailed research would be needed to further clarify the 
precise nature and role (if any) of mental health problems in the 
development of their violent activity.”60
This debate is on-going within the wider study of crime as 
well. On the one hand, a strand of research assumes a consistent 
causal link between psychiatric symptoms (where they are found 
to be present) and criminal behavior.61 On the other hand, a more 
nuanced strand of research argues there are “a (small) group of 
offenders whose symptoms relate directly to crime and a (larger) 
group whose symptoms and crimes are not directly related.”62 For 
example, various studies illustrate that the offender (across a range 
of crimes) experienced his/her psychiatric symptoms at the time of 
the (often violent) crime between 4% and 18% of the time.63 There 
is no reason to suggest this should be any different for a terrorist 
subset of offenders. If anything, one might presume the figures to 
be lower given the wider ideology and ideologues underpinning it 
provide a grievance and set of instructions on who to target and 
how. A complex mixture of personality, situational, and personal 
drivers (among others) likely drives most general crime. Terrorism 
is no different but for the addition of an overarching ideology. The 
presence of this ideology in the motivational mix therefore likely 
lessens the relative cognitive response to mental health problems.
k For over 40 years, argument has ensued in the schizophrenia and violence 
literature as to whether schizophrenia is definitively linked to an increased 
risk of engaging in violence. There are multiple extraneous risk factors 
that individuals with schizophrenia may be exposed to (e.g. drug use, 
homelessness) that are now recognized as increasing the risk of violence 
across populations, not just among those with schizophrenia.
Conclusion 
It is simply too early to come to a definitive answer regarding the 
role of mental health problems and various forms of Islamic State 
terrorism. Mental disorders appear more prevalent among those 
inspired by Islamic State than those directed by it. Beyond that, 
however, it is difficult to make clear conclusions. The available 
open-source information is clouded by poor reporting practices, 
the tendency to treat all mental health disorders equally, and the 
fetishized way mental health is reported. The answer is likely to 
differ wildly from case to case depending upon the individual’s di-
agnosis, prior life experiences, co-existence of other stressors and 
vulnerabilities, and lack of protective factors. Researchers need to 
have a mature enough response in practice, research, and public 
discussion that is comfortable with this complexity; understand 
that where it is present, it is usually one of several drivers; and do 
so by not stigmatizing the vast majority that suffer from mental 
health problems while remaining non-violent, non-radicalized, and 
in need of care. 
What we see from the existing research is that lone-actor terror-
ism is usually the culmination of a complex mix of personal, polit-
ical, and social drivers that crystalize at the same time to drive the 
individual down the path of violent action. This should be no dif-
ferent for those inspired by the Islamic State. Whether the violence 
comes to fruition is usually a combination of the availability and 
vulnerability of suitable targets and the individual’s capability to en-
gage in an attack from both a psychological and technical capability 
standpoint. Many individual cases share a mixture of personal life 
circumstances coupled with an intensification of beliefs that later 
developed into the idea to engage in violence. What differs is how 
these influences were sequenced. Sometimes personal problems led 
to a susceptibility to ideological influences. Sometimes long-held 
ideological influences became intensified after the experience of 
personal problems. This is why we should be wary of mono-causal 
‘master narratives’ about how this process unfolds. Mental health 
problems are undoubtedly important in some cases. Intuitively, we 
might see how in some cases it can make carrying out violence eas-
ier. In other cases, it may make the adoption of the ideology easier 
because of delusional thinking or fixated behaviors. However, it will 
only ever be one of many drivers in an individual’s pathway to vio-
lence. In many cases, it may be present but completely unrelated. 
The development of radicalization and attack planning behaviors 
is usually far more labyrinthine and dynamic than one single fac-
tor can explain, be it mental disorders (today’s go-to silver-bullet 
explanation), online radicalization (another popular silver-bullet 
explanation), or root causes that encompass socio-demographic 
characteristics. 
We must also bear in mind that the relationship between men-
tal health problems and terrorist engagement is just one part of 
the story. Given the scale and types of violence being conducted by 
the Islamic State, many perpetrators will develop mental health 
problems as a byproduct of involvement as opposed to it being a 
driver of involvement. There will also be a generation of children 
who were born within the Islamic State and/or trained as fighters, 
many of whom will return to their parents’ country of origin in the 
coming years. The interface of mental health practitioners and the 
Islamic State will, therefore, not just be limited to assessing the risk 
of whether someone will become a terrorist but will be extended to 
safeguarding and treatment.
In conclusion, after many years in the dark, the link between 
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Month/Year Attacks Possibly Influenced by the Islamic State 
(according to media reports)
Media Reporting on Psychological or 
Psychiatric Intervention
May 2014 Brussels Jewish Museum shooting No
September 2014 Endeavor Hills, Melbourne stabbing No, but evidence of counselor intervention 
for radical behavior
September 2014 Moore, Oklahoma beheading attack Yes
October 2014 Saint-Jean-sur-Richelieu, Quebec vehicular 
ramming
Yes
October 2014 Ottawa Parliament shooting Yes
October 2014 New York hatchet attack No, but family reporting of depression
October 2014 Kvissel, Denmark murder No
December 2014 Sydney Lindt Cafe siege Yes
December 2014 Joué-lès-Tours, France police station stabbing No
December 2014 Dijon vehicular ramming Yes
January 2015 Metz police assault Yes
January 2015 Paris kosher market attack and murder No; received psychological assessment 
without specific diagnosis or treatment
February 2015 Nice police stabbing Yes
February 2015 Copenhagen shootings No
April 2015 Zvornik, Bosnia police station shooting No
May 2015 Garland, Texas shooting No
June 2015 Saint-Quentin-Fallavier, France factory attack No, but attacker committed suicide in prison
August 2015 Thalys train attack No
September 2015 Sandholm asylum center police stabbing No
October 2015 Parramatta, Sydney police shooting Yes
November 2015 University of California stabbing No
November 2015 Marseille anti-semitic stabbing No
November 2015 Paris attacks No
December 2015 San Bernardino attack No
December 2015 Leytonstone, London Tube attack Yes
January 2016 Valence, France soldier vehicular ramming No
January 2016 Goutte d’Or, Paris police station attack No
January 2016 Philadelphia police shooting Yes
January 2016 Marseille Jewish school machete attack No
Appendix: Attacks Possibly Influenced by the Islamic State and Psychological Instability
mental health problems and terrorist engagement is now often 
the “go-to” explanation. This is partially due to the studies, cited 
above, that showed the relatively high rates within specific terror-
ist sub-samples. These studies coalesced in time with an uptick in 
Islamic State lone-actor plots and attacks and were latched onto by 
media, the public and policymaker communities hungry for intui-
tively appealing and straightforward answers. Much of the nuance 
within these studies was lost, however. Just because a factor (such 
as mental disorder) was present, does not make it causal. Nor does 
it necessarily make it facilitative. It may be completely irrelevant 
altogether. Contemporary media reporting may have led to a poten-
tially overinflated sense of how prevalent the link truly is and how 
closely tied it is to the individual’s pathway into terrorism.     CTC
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February 2016 Rochdale Imam murder No
February 2016 Hanover police stabbing No
March 2016 Toronto army recruitment center stabbing Yes
March 2016 Brussels attacks No
April 2016 Kempsey, Australia prison assault No
April 2016 Essen Sikh temple bombing No
May 2016 Saint Julien du Puy, France soldier stabbing No
May 2016 Grafing, Germany train station stabbing Yes
June 2016 Etterbeek, Brussels stabbing No
June 2016 Florida Pulse night club shooting No
June 2016 Magnanville, France stabbings No
July 2016 Nice truck attack Yes
July 2016 Würzburg, Bavaria train stabbing No
July 2016 Ansbach, Bavaria suicide bombing Yes
July 2016 Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray church attack Yes (for one assailant)
August 2016 Charleroi police stabbing No
August 2016 Strasbourg stabbing Yes
August 2016 Queensland hostel stabbing Yes
August 2016 Oberhausen music festival stabbing Yes
August 2016 Toulouse police stabbing Yes
August 2016 Copenhagen shooting No
September 2016 Vincennes, Paris stabbing Yes
September 2016 Osny, France prison attack No
September 2016 Taranto, Italy prison attack No
September 2016 Minto, Sydney stabbing Yes
September 2016 Rimini police attack No
Islamic State-directed attacks by individuals recruited in person into the group and tasked with launching attacks are shaded in gray. The 
Brussels Jewish museum shooting by a French Islamic State recruit was not categorized as Islamic State-directed because it is not yet clear 
whether he was tasked by the group to launch an attack.
All the attacks involved one attacker except the Paris attacks (nine attackers), the Brussels attacks (five attackers), the stabbing attack on a 
Jewish teacher in Marseille (three attackers), the Sikh temple bombing in Essen (three attackers), the San Bernardino attack (two attackers), 
the Kvissel murder (two attackers), the Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray church attack (two attackers), the Rochdale murder (two attackers), and 
the Saint Julien du Puy attack (two attackers). In total, there were 55 cases involving 76 attackers. There was media reporting indicating 
psychological instability for 21 of the attackers (27.6%). Excluding Islamic State-directed attacks, the percentage of attackers with reported 
psychological instability was 34.4%.
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Peter T. Edge was appointed Acting Deputy Director of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) on January 20, 
2017. At the time of this interview, he was Executive Associate 
Director of Homeland Security Investigations (HSI). Prior to 
this position, Mr. Edge served as Deputy Executive Associate 
Director and the Special Agent in Charge in the HSI Newark, 
New Jersey, regional office. Mr. Edge has extensive experience 
conducting narcotics, money laundering, commercial fraud, and 
corruption investigations. 
Wil van Gemert was appointed Deputy Director of Europol and 
Head of the Operations Department in May 2014. He previously 
filled several positions in the Dutch police and joined the Dutch 
National Intelligence Service in 2004. In 2012, he was Director 
of Cyber Security of the Dutch Government. In his current role 
at Europol, he manages a department of experts, specialists and 
analysts dealing with serious and organized crime as well as 
terrorism and cybercrime. 
CTC: What role do your organizations play in identifying, 
tracking, and potentially interdicting foreign terrorist fighters 
who have traveled to Syria, Iraq, and other jihadi battlegrounds?
Edge: When it comes to foreign terrorist fighters, Homeland Securi-
ty Investigations [HSI, a directorate within the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
component] is a border security investigative agency that conducts 
transnational, criminal organization-related investigations around 
the world. We have a very vibrant investigative footprint here in the 
United States. We also have a very active intelligence program that 
processes a lot of human intelligence information through various 
means, and we have a significant international footprint. We’re in 
47 countries, and we have 63 offices. We’ve leveraged that inter-
national connectivity to enhance our investigative efforts and to 
share information with our partners, not only on a bilateral but on 
a multilateral basis. And that’s where the relationship with Europol 
has been critical to our collective success.
Van Gemert: Europol is the European informational hub and fu-
sion center for law enforcement. Unlike CBP [U.S. Customs and 
Border Patrol] or ICE HSI, we don’t have our own investigatory 
powers. But we have a threefold task: firstly, to build up and analyze 
the data and information available in the 28 E.U. member states 
in different fields of crime including terrorism; secondly, to be the 
center of expertise in those fields in which we are active—organized 
crime, terrorism, migration, and cyber crime—and finally, to coor-
dinate the actions of the different member states so as to ensure 
that information is turned into operational actions and real time 
cross-border investigations. In recent years, we moved from not 
only collecting information but to connecting information. For the 
purpose of thorough analysis, we therefore centralize information 
from member states and international partners in what we call focal 
points, including on foreign fighters. The information flow from 
member states and international partners, including the U.S., has 
significantly increased since the emergence of the ISIS threat. 
We have now in our headquarters in The Hague more than 210 
liaison officers coming from 41 different countries and represent-
ing 74 different agencies. That gives us a huge opportunity to work 
together closely. After the attacks in Paris and Brussels, I was able 
also to call up all member states involved on very short notice to 
sit together and to exchange information, including also with U.S. 
partners like ICE, HSI, or CBP. We set up an emergency response 
team at Europol to make sure that we could deliver additional in-
formation to the ongoing law enforcement investigations. Directly 
after the Paris attacks, we had more than 60 people involved as 
part of an emergency response team. More than one year later, we 
have on a permanent basis still more than 10 people working on 
making sure that all information we receive on these cases is cross-
checked, connected, assessed, and turned into new intelligence. As 
regards ICE HSI in particular, we have even increased the extraor-
dinary cooperation we already had with HSI in making sure that 
all available financial information and cross-border information 
was brought to the attention of agencies in Europe and the United 
States, and it delivered a very rich view of those who were involved 
in and supporting this network. The data Europol has is, I think, 
our biggest added value. We have more than 30 million entities 
in our databases, and our data on organized crime is particularly 
valuable because we’ve seen a very strong relationship between or-
ganized crime and terrorism. 
CTC: Can you elaborate on that link?
Van Gemert: If you look at the Paris and Brussels attackers and 
their backgrounds, there are a lot of criminal links. This is also a 
feature of the support networks behind ISIS terrorism in Europe. 
We see an increased interweaving of terrorism and criminal activ-
ities. They make use of the same crime service model as criminals 
do. And that can be an advantage to investigators. With the attacks 
in Brussels and Paris, it’s clear the attack network made use of a 
criminal service in providing them identification documents. And 
this means that through a normal criminal investigation on fraud-
ulent documents, you could also find very important information 
on terrorism. The risk we face is, to a significant degree, a known 
risk that’s already in our systems because most of the foreign fight-
ers from Europe had criminal backgrounds before they left for the 
battlefields. 
CTC: How are HSI and Europol cooperating, and what type of 
broader transatlantic cooperation are you engaged in?
Edge: Traditionally, our international connectivity with our foreign 
partners had been on a bilateral basis. Ever since we have assigned 
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agents and analysts to Europol, we have enjoyed multilateral rela-
tionships, and we have been able to share the benefit of our com-
bined experience and investigative expertise. That has resulted in 
greater information sharing. 
Let me give you one example. What Wil mentioned with regard 
to the sharing of financial information is critical to every investi-
gation and every crime that we enforce against. HSI has built very, 
very good relationships with other industries—both in the private 
sector and other law enforcement—which help us with financial 
investigations. In the instance of the horrific events in Brussels and 
in Paris, we were able to leverage those relationships and get that 
information quickly. As Wil mentioned, our strong links to Europol 
afforded us the opportunity to then share that information with the 
member states in a very timely fashion. 
We have also become members of other focal points that have a 
nexus to our mission—including migrant smuggling. To have that 
connectivity in that multilateral environment has been very helpful. 
I like the way Wil put it—“from collecting to connecting.” For years, 
we’ve always collected information, but now thanks to enhanced 
information sharing, we’re connecting the dots. And that’s critical 
to the public safety of all of our countries. 
Van Gemert: I would totally agree with Peter. At Europol, we have 
more than 200 liaison officers who know each other, work with 
each other, and speak one language—English. And we are also the 
go-to point for countries to reach out to. While we also see the value 
of bilateral relationships, the experience we have in cyber and now 
also in terrorism has shown it’s necessary not only to connect our 
information flows but to have operational meetings on a multilat-
eral basis. The significant rise in the number of U.S. liaison officials 
stationed here at Europol headquarters, including very dedicated 
staff from ICE HSI, has really helped in this regard, as have regular 
visits and exchanges at the managerial and leadership levels. There 
are now 11 U.S. agencies represented over here, taking part in var-
ious focal points and high-priority cases. You don’t have to send a 
message via cable and wait for the answer. You just sit with each 
other and directly engage. 
CTC: Western counterterrorism officials have sounded the 
alarm about the large cohort of foreign fighters from Europe 
and the West who have trained in Syria and Iraq. FBI Director 
James Comey has warned that this terrorist diaspora is going to 
be like “we’ve never seen before.”1 From your perspective, how 
can the United States and Europe work together to mitigate the 
threat?
Van Gemert: If you look at foreign fighters, there will be a window 
of risk coming up as the pressure increases on ISIS. There have been 
between 6,000 and 7,000 foreign fighters who have traveled from 
Europe. Only a third of them have so far returned, so there’s the 
possibility a lot more will return as ISIS loses territory. That said, in 
recent months, we’ve not yet seen a big exodus of European fighters 
returning home from the battlefield. Those recently fleeing back to 
Europe have mostly been women and children.
Moving forward, we need to interdict foreign fighters on their 
return to Europe and, when appropriate, charge them and put them 
on trial. With the coalition making advances and taking ISIS fight-
ers into custody, we will probably get more people that can tell us 
something about those fighters who have been active over there and 
will find more forensic evidence to obtain convictions. We also have 
to increase our capability to detect document fraud and monitor 
travel to Europe. The European Counter Terrorism Center (ECTC) 
will need to be at the center of these efforts. We have deployed guest 
officers in Greece (and will do soon in Italy) that conduct secondary 
security checks on those immigrants that give us reason to double 
check. These persons are referred to us by the local authorities and 
border guards, which perform the first-line checks. We have set up 
diagnostic tools that can be used by our border patrol officers to 
look at connections that could indicate whether a person might 
have intentions other than claiming asylum.
But the threat is actually not just from foreign fighters, because 
ISIS has also tasked fighters who are from Syria, Iraq, and other 
non-Western countries to travel to launch attacks. We saw that in 
the November 2015 Paris attacks. At Europol, we refer to these as 
“tasked fighters.” These are not directly on our radar, and identi-
fying them is difficult. And then there are those inspired to act as 
a result of ISIS social media or through contact with the group. 
We’ve seen examples of people becoming radicalized in a very short 
period, going from ‘zero to hero’ in six weeks or less, sometimes 
making themselves available for attacks to atone for past ‘un-Is-
lamic’ behavior. 
All this means the threat is very broad and is coming from very 
different angles. Over the long-term, I think ISIS will be defeated 
on the battlefield, and at least the existing caliphate will disappear. 
But something will replace it. ISIS already has a strategy to create 
a cyber caliphate, and more than 20 groups around the world have 
pledged loyalty to ISIS. We’re seeing that to a significant degree in 
Asia, including countries like the Philippines, so the threat is likely 
to come from there as well as the Middle East in the future. All this 
means we’re probably not going to see this threat going away for de-
cades. It will just have a different appearance. It will be focused es-
pecially on reaching our communities through social media, which 
is why we really try to invest in counteracting them in this field. 
Edge: At HSI, we have 6,700 special agents, and they are encour-
aged to identify the threat streams and smuggling routes. They look 
for document fraud day-to-day. We have seen more special-interest 
alien travel through non-traditional smuggling routes, and just be-
ing able to identify those routes is going to be critical. The capturing 
of biographical information on these actors through our BITMAP 
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program is also going to be very important.a
We have charged our personnel to prioritize focusing on illicit 
travel, including document and benefit fraud that is utilized to fa-
cilitate foreign fighter travel. We are actively acquiring information 
on fraudulent passports and travel documents. We have a forensic 
document lab that analyzes and processes this information and 
maintains a repository of hundreds of thousands of false passports 
and other travel documents. I think terrorists traveling with false 
papers will be a big problem in the future, and it’s going to be critical 
to identify them and share that information because these actors 
typically go all over the world.
As well as looking at non-traditional smuggling routes, we are 
continuing to work to identify those individuals attempting to come 
though the prevailing smuggling routes. We have a joint task force 
model in the Department of Homeland Security that focuses pri-
marily on our southwest border, the gateway into the United States 
for almost all illicit trade, travel, and commerce. We are working 
very closely with our international partners in South and Central 
America to encourage their law enforcement to work with us. And 
to that end, we’ve created transnational criminal investigative units 
in certain countries that have helped us identify threat streams and 
smuggling routes where people are using false documents to try to 
transit into the U.S.
CTC: More than half the members of the Islamic State terror-
ist cell dispatched from Syria that attacked Paris in November 
2015 and Brussels in March 2016 were already on the radar 
screen of Western intelligence agencies. Yet they succeeded in 
infiltrating Europe undetected in the fall of 2015 by exploiting 
refugee flows, several by using doctored Syrian passports.2 
What lessons have been learned since the Paris and Brussels 
attacks? 
Van Gemert: A lot of lessons have already been identified. One has 
to bear in mind that this was part of a huge immigration flow of 
more than one million people, in which the systems were simply not 
able to function as they should. If you have 5,000 people coming 
every day to a Greek island as you had in the autumn of 2015, it’s 
nearly impossible to control it completely. Since then, the European 
Union has made political agreements to control the flow. 
We’re working to identify indicators that can be used in train-
ing and guiding our border patrol officers to check identity papers 
better. As mentioned earlier, we’re doing secondary security checks 
and have set up “hotspot teams” at various entry points in the 
Mediterranean. This means Europol staff and guest officers from 
E.U. member states coordinated by Europol are present in refugee 
camps on 5 Greek islands identified as “hotspots” on the migration 
routes to Europe. All migrants arriving on these islands are taken 
to these camps after arriving onshore. Within the camps, additional 
security checks take place against our databases if there is some 
form of suspicion regarding a migrant’s background or motivation. 
All these activities are part of Europol’s European Counter Ter-
rorism Center, which was set up after the Paris attacks. It brings to-
a Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) 
is an HSI-led initiative that fills biometric databases with data collected 
from special interest aliens, violent criminals, fugitives, and confirmed 
or suspected terrorists encountered within illicit pathways. This data 
helps HSI form strategic pictures of the trends, networks, and individuals 
connected with these pathways.
gether in one place all of Europol’s CT tools in order to enhance our 
role as the E.U. information hub on CT matters and to deliver oper-
ational support and analysis to E.U. member states’ CT investiga-
tions, drawing on Europol’s unique capabilities relating for example 
to terrorist financing, firearms, or online propaganda. At the heart 
of ECTC is a Joint Liaison Team with dedicated CT investigators 
from E.U. member states and selected international partners such 
as the U.S. These CT experts are specifically deployed to Europol for 
the purpose of enhancing European cooperation in counterterror-
ism matters. Enhancing information exchange on Foreign Terrorist 
Fighters or on the criminal support networks for terrorist structures 
are just some of the specific projects currently on the operational 
agenda in the fight against terrorism on the European level.
CTC: Just to follow up, Europol Director Wainwright recently 
stated, “ISIL are in the business of getting their people back 
into Europe in increasingly sophisticated ways,” which includes 
obtaining high-quality, false travel documents.3 As early as 
2015, HSI raised concerns about the Islamic State acquiring 
blank passports and passport-printing machines in Syria.4 Giv-
en that the Islamic State has been able to create identity papers 
for its operatives from real Syrian passports,b how are security 
agencies working to verify those claiming asylum in Europe are 
who they say they are?
Edge: The 2015 report illustrates the need for our continued efforts 
to identify and address potential vulnerabilities as they pertain to 
b Editor’s note: Interpol has data on 250,000 lost or stolen Syrian and Iraqi 
passports, including blanks. The Paris attack cell and a trio of Syrians 
arrested in Germany in September 2016 appear to have been supplied 
with doctored Syrian passports by the same forger, according to German 
officials. A significant number of the Islamic State operatives who have 
infiltrated Europe have come in using doctored Syrian passports. At 
least two of the Paris attack network reportedly had adulterated Syrian 
passports, which were part of a batch of 3,800 blank Syrian passports 
obtained by the Islamic State in Raqqa and Deir-ez-Zour. These were 
reportedly flagged to Interpol by the Syrian regime well before the Paris 
attacks: Giulia Paravicini, “EU’s passport fraud ‘epidemic,’” Politico, January 
28, 2016; Euan McKirdy, Stephanie Halasz, and Jason Hanna, “Germany: 3 
alleged ISIS members arrested in Paris attacks probe,” CNN, September 13, 
2016; Manuel Bewarder and Florian Flade, “Die geheimen Reisen des BND 
nach Damaskus,” Die Welt, May 29, 2016.
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terrorist travel. The acquisition of documents through fraudulent 
means is what worries me the most, and we are going to have to 
continue to address it by working with our European counterparts 
on the Turkey, Greece, and Balkan routes. HSI collects relevant in-
formation within our core mission spaces of document and benefit 
fraud, and we share that information through our investigative and 
liaison activities to ensure our partners are aware of the potential 
threats we identify. HSI works with the Department of State and 
other federal agencies to share biometric and biographical infor-
mation on potential travelers. Visa and other applicants to the U.S. 
are vetted both biometrically and biographically. Individuals de-
nied nonimmigrant visas based on severe derogatory information 
are watch-listed. Lost or stolen passports are flagged and checked 
across various datasets to include asylum information. Finally, the 
HSI Forensic Laboratory conducts forensic examinations of Syrian 
passports to determine authenticity. The laboratory has produced a 
document alert and Syrian document reference guide to assist law 
enforcement and border control authorities in the identification 
of fraudulent Syrian passports. This information is disseminated 
to partners worldwide, including to European counterparts. These 
reference products are based on information developed from fo-
rensic examinations of Syrian passports and received through law 
enforcement channels, but the lack of reliable information from 
the issuing government limits what can be disseminated to field 
officers.
Also, from the U.S. perspective, we’ve got to do more in the con-
tinent of Africa. We need to work closer with our law enforcement 
partners in Africa to identify places where these folks will go for 
training and then will begin their illicit travel from. At HSI, leverag-
ing our intelligence portfolio and our international partnerships is 
going to be critical to identify the smuggling and document forgery 
networks used by foreign fighters. They’re ever-evolving. It’s going 
to take cooperation again through the law enforcement partners 
we have around the world to identify those smuggling routes, share 
that information, and connect the dots of the biometric information 
and the biographical information available to us. 
Van Gemert: And I should add we can certainly learn from one 
another across the Atlantic when it comes to improving vetting pro-
cedures. When it comes to identifying document fraud, information 
is key, including extracting information from documents recovered 
from the battlefield. They could provide the key informational links 
in identifying travelers that were unknown or give indications on 
travel documents that could be used by returnees and attackers. 
In identifying document fraud and other efforts to track foreign 
fighters, one thing we need to do better in Europe is connect the 
dots between information developed by law enforcement agencies 
in criminal investigations and by intelligence agencies in national 
security investigations. This is the discussion we are now having 
in Europe: how do we do this in a proper way, how to make sure 
that we have the right watch list that is fed not only by intelligence 
services but also by law enforcement, and how to make sure infor-
mation is flowing between the two. And that’s still something that 
we are getting better at but have not solved. 
CTC: There has been concern that the visa waiver program 
between the United States and Europe could be exploited by 
European extremists or terrorist recruits to enter the United 
States.c How are the United States and Europe working togeth-
er to mitigate risk in this area?
Edge: One of the things that is going to be critical is being able to 
identify asylum fraud, a pervasive problem. Smuggling networks 
are using false documents to transport special-interest aliens from 
Europe into countries in the Western Hemisphere on a routine 
basis. But there is actually a technological fix to the whole issue 
of document fraud. Key to clamping down on illicit travel will be 
greater use of biometrics, and we are already moving in this direc-
tion. More widespread use of biometric passports will make our visa 
security program much more comprehensive. It will help us verify 
exactly who we’re dealing with and then share and cross-check that 
information with our counterparts at Europol. 
CTC: Given the potentially significant economic costs and 
logistical challenges, how far away are we from the biometric 
fix?
Edge: At present, neither Syria nor Iraq issues electronic passports.d 
While technical solutions have enhanced the ability to recognize 
document fraud, there are also inherent limitations. The lack of 
interoperability, resources, funding, and technological limitations 
have presented challenges for implementation. In addition, these 
solutions do not address the ability of persons obtaining genuinely 
issued documents via fraudulent means.
Technological solutions are an important component in verify-
ing the integrity of the traveler and his/her associated legitimate 
travel document. To date, through DHS’ Secure Real-Time Plat-
form, we have vetted over 300,000 immigration applications for 
international partners, helping them to identify potential travel 
by known or suspected terrorists. We have also recently begun to 
compare select refugee applications and enforcement cases against 
foreign data.
However, revisiting themes I referenced earlier, we have seen 
situations where this is still only a partial solution. For techno-
logical solutions to be effective, any country that could be used 
to further illicit travel must have the capability to scan biometric 
passports and identity cards. Deploying the feature in travel doc-
uments and having the interoperable capacity to use them are two 
different things. For example, we have seen smuggling networks use 
authentic documents acquired through theft or purchase to enter 
the Western Hemisphere. The networks will push use of legitimate 
c Editor’s note: In the more than 25-year period of the visa waiver program, 
there have been around 300 million entries into the United States, but 
according to RAND terrorism researcher Brian Jenkins, only three Islamist 
terrorists have reached the United States by plane from the countries 
concerned. Brian Michael Jenkins, “Inspiration, Not Infiltration: Jihadist 
Conspirators in the United States,” testimony presented before the House 
Oversight and Governmental Reform Committee, December 10, 2015, pp. 
5-6; Jenkins email to CTC Sentinel, January 2017.
d Editor’s note: Electronic passports (also known as e-passports) issued 
by the United States and countries belonging to the Visa Waiver Program 
contain a “biometric identifier,” with the United States requiring that the 
chip contain a digital photograph of the holder. The United States requires 
that travelers entering the United States under the Visa Waiver Program 
have an e-passport if their passport was issued on or after October 26, 
2006. British e-passports contain the holder’s “facial biometric,” and facial 
recognition software is deployed at e-passport gates at all major airports in 
the United Kingdom. See Department of Homeland Security, “E-Passports;” 
HM Passport Office, “Guidance: Biometric passports and passport readers,” 
August 8, 2016; NIDirect, “Using ePassport gates at airport border control.” 
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travel systems to the fullest extent possible to realize efficiencies, 
but will incorporate smuggling and fake documents as necessary to 
evade screening and border controls until finally approaching the 
U.S. southwest border and declaring asylum. 
Van Gemert: I agree greater introduction of biometrics will really 
help us in identifying who is really traveling. In Europe, all Schen-
gen countries are obliged to include biometrics in all new passports 
since 2006 (facial image) and 2009 (fingerprints). But it will take a 
long transition time, of course, until all passport holders have new 
passports with these features. Just to put it in perspective, the E.U. 
has 500 million inhabitants and 28 member states. 
In the meantime, we need to make better use of the tools already 
in place, and we need to work to create a legal architecture better 
equipped to deal with the threat. Data protection requirements at 
the time of the November 2015 Paris attacks created separations 
between the different European systems we were using such as the 
Schengen Information System and the Visa Information System 
and systems we use at Europol. And when politicians ask us, “Why 
are these systems not aligned with each other? Why is this not 
happening?” the answer is “that’s because there was a conscious 
political decision in the past not to align these systems, which were 
built for different purposes.” I think there’s a common political un-
derstanding now in the European Union on the need to remove 
such legal barriers and to create better interoperability between the 
different information systems.
CTC: Concerns have been expressed that the Islamic State op-
eratives may seek to gain entry into the United States by ex-
ploiting refugee flows from Syria and elsewhere.e What is being 
done by DHS to mitigate risk in this area? 
Edge: DHS is certainly doing its part to address the Syrian ref-
ugee crisis. Citizenship and Immigration Services in conjunction 
with the Department of State is doing most of the work in that 
space. They’ve admitted more than 10,000 Syrian refugees in this 
fiscal year alone. All these refugees, including the Syrians, have 
been admitted only after completing a series of stringent securi-
ty and screening and vetting processes. Security checks have been 
implemented, as well as categorizing them as frequent travelers or 
infrequent travelers. HSI has been included in the vetting process 
from a criminal investigative perspective and has provided all the 
information we have acquired to the lead agencies. 
e Editor’s note: In 2015, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 
informed Congress that it had identified “individuals with ties to terrorist 
groups in Syria attempting to gain entry to the U.S. through the U.S. refugee 
program.” The U.S. government has resettled about 12,000 Syrian refugees 
in the United States since the Syrian civil war began, around 80 percent 
of whom are women and children. Some American law enforcement 
and intelligence officials have said there are informational black holes 
creating challenges in screening such refugees. There have been no 
publicly identified cases of refugees from the Syrian civil war charged with 
terrorism offenses in the United States. Haeyoun Park and Rudy Omri, “U.S. 
Reaches Goal of Admitting 10,000 Syrian Refugees. Here’s Where They 
Went,” New York Times, August 31, 2016. “McCaul Statement on Concerns 
Regarding Syrian Refugee Program,” Homeland Security Committee, 
December 7, 2015; Jared Goyette, “Most Syrian refugees coming to U.S. 
are women, children,” USA Today, August 9, 2016; “The ISIS Terror Threat in 
America,” Majority Staff, Homeland Security Committee, November 2016; 
“Nation’s Top Security Officials’ Concerns on Refugee Vetting,” Majority 
Staff, Homeland Security Committee, November 19, 2015.
CTC: The numbers of irregular migrants entering Europe 
through the Turkey-Greece-Balkan route sharply dropped this 
year. Given the Islamic State was able to exploit the fall 2015 
migrant crisis to infiltrate operatives into Europe, what kind 
of contingency planning has been done to prevent a reoccur-
rence of this infiltration in case there is a future surge in the 
numbers? 
Van Gemert: With everything in place now, with the E.U.’s coor-
dinated efforts in the migration hotspots, with the support we are 
delivering to frontline countries like Greece and Italy, and with im-
provements in our capability to quickly react, I think that even if 
there were an opening of the borders again, there would be a bet-
ter response than in late 2015 and early 2016 because we’re better 
prepared. But still, this would be a big issue for us, and it would be 
something that would need to be solved on the political level rather 
than just by police or law enforcement. 
CTC: How useful have the thousands of registration documents 
and other documents recovered from the Islamic State5 been in 
identifying Westerners who have joined the Islamic State and 
other terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq?
Edge: The registration documents have been critical to our ability 
to analyze the travel of the Westerners who have joined the Islam-
ic State. So that has been something that has been very, very im-
portant to us. From the perspective of HSI, it’s also important to 
note that ISIS has demonstrated the capability to exploit a lot of 
travel-related vulnerabilities, which means we need to continue to 
leverage our resources to acquire information, including informa-
tion obtained by the United States from the battlefield, and share it 
through Europol. One of the things that has been critically helpful 
to us and something that we’re earnestly investing in is analyzing 
social media linked to foreign fighters to see what they’re saying to 
each other and what sources of information they’re accessing so 
that we can stay two steps ahead of them as they are traveling the 
world and can make the appropriate notifications to our partners. 
Van Gemert: I agree that the registration documents and other 
battlefield intelligence has been critical. Convictions in criminal 
trials for returning fighters require proof and these kinds of docu-
ments are essential in that regard. 
I have the same view on the importance of social media analysis 
as Peter. The biggest innovation I’ve seen in the last year at Europol 
was our emphasis on social media and open source monitoring. This 
has resulted in a better understanding of foreign fighters and the 
smuggling and financial networks they are accessing. The biggest 
added value in my view is improving understanding of how ISIS 
uses social media and being able to analyze the social media pres-
ence of a target including identifying his network and, in that way, 
being able to create a cyber profile next to the target’s regular re-
al-life profile, which generally delivers very useful new information 
to investigators.
Another important tool for us is Europol’s internet referral unit,6 
which detects terrorist and violent extremist online content, flags 
and refers such content to internet providers, and asks for its re-
moval. The referrals are made to platforms like Twitter or Facebook 
notifying them that particular content is in conflict with their own 
terms of service, after which, in 90 percent of the cases, the content 
is removed by the company itself.     CTC
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The civil war in Yemen is providing an ideal operational 
environment for al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP). The war has acted as a catalyst for the 
organization’s evolution. AQAP is now focused on 
implementing a more covert strategy that allows it 
to expand its ties to local communities and to further 
enmesh itself within some forces battling the Houthis 
and their allies. These deepening ties with local 
communities and anti-Houthi forces mean that AQAP 
will be even more resilient and more difficult to combat. 
T he civil war in Yemen has been a gift to al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP, like all insurgent groups, thrives in environments where state authority is weak or non-existent, where poverty is endemic, and where opposition forces are fragmented. The months 
of unrelenting war in Yemen have amplified all of these conditions. 
AQAP is honing and refining its capabilities in multiple areas, and 
in what is a dangerous parallel with Syria, it is deepening its ties 
to local communities and enmeshing itself within the groups that 
oppose Yemen’s Houthi rebels and their allies.
Yemen’s political landscape is as complex and unforgiving as its 
rugged terrain. The country’s civil war mirrors this complexity. The 
civil war is not being fought by two parties but rather by multiple 
groups whose loyalties are often fluid. The war has drawn in outside 
powers, most notably Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), that are backing Yemen’s internationally recognized gov-
ernment in its fight against Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The Houthis, a 
predominantly Zaidi Shi`a revivalist movement, are currently al-
lied with former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh along with a 
significant portion of the Yemeni Army that has remained loyal to 
the former president. 
In March 2015, Saudi Arabia and its coalition partners launched 
“Operation Decisive Storm,” a military campaign that was ostensibly 
designed to defeat the Houthis and reinstall Yemen’s government in 
exile, led by President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi. While the cam-
paign has thus far failed to achieve its aims, it has helped create an 
ideal operational space for AQAP, one of al-Qa`ida’s most nimble 
and resilient franchises. AQAP acted decisively to fill the power vac-
uum left by the unraveling of Yemen’s Armed Forces (YAF) and its 
limited state structures. While AQAP is no longer overtly holding 
territory, the organization’s influence and operational reach extend 
across much of southern Yemen.1
AQAP, which is now better funded and armed than at any point 
in its history,a has implemented a three-point strategy. First, AQAP 
has realized that it cannot alienate those it seeks to govern by en-
forcing all aspects of its understanding of Islamic law. It is thus 
demonstrating its capacity to ‘govern’ and provide basic services, 
most particularly security. Second, AQAP is deepening its ties 
with Yemen’s tribes whose power has been enhanced by the civil 
war. Third, AQAP is enmeshing itself within some of those forces 
fighting against the Houthis and their allies. Concurrent with this 
three-point strategy and in support of it, AQAP is working to fur-
ther develop its intelligence and counterintelligence cells. It is also 
developing its capacity to utilize what can be termed semi-conven-
tional tactics on the battlefield.b
Lessons Learned
The popular uprising against Saleh in 2011 provided AQAP with 
an operational environment that was not too different from the one 
that now exists in large parts of southern Yemen. The contested 
uprising against Saleh—who remained popular with many Yeme-
nis—sowed dissent within the YAF.2 The dissent within the Yemeni 
Army and the removal of key units from vulnerable parts of south-
ern Yemen left a void that AQAP quickly filled. By March 2011, 
AQAP was in control of large parts of the governorates of Abyan 
and Shabwa and declared the formation of an Islamic emirate in 
parts of both governorates.3 In late May 2011, AQAP, which by then 
had begun referring to parts of its organization as Ansar al-Sharia, 
seized the town of Zinjibar, the capital of Abyan. AQAP was able 
to maintain control of parts of Abyan and Zinjibar until May 2012 
when a successful offensive was launched by a combination of Ye-
meni Army units and tribal militias that were carefully aided by the 
United States.4
AQAP’s seizure of Zinjibar and the surrounding areas provided 
it with its first opportunity to hold and ‘govern’ a territory. While 
a This observation by the author is based on numerous interviews with 
observers of al-Qa`ida in Yemen as well as open source information.
b The Yemeni Armed Forces, in particular the Yemeni Army, have never been a 
particularly cohesive fighting force. Many units were and are administered 
like personal fiefdoms by their commanding officers, where soldiers 
frequently view orders from their commanders as suggestions rather than 
orders. Many units up to the brigade level are organized according to tribal 
affiliations with ‘stronger’ tribes being assigned to the better-funded and 
better-equipped units. 
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AQAP was eventually forced out of the governorate with heavy loss-
es, the year in which it controlled the area was instructive. AQAP’s 
reign over parts of Abyan and Shabwa was an experiment in which 
its leadership was able to test how far it could go in imposing its 
interpretation of Islamic law. During this period, AQAP’s leader-
ship was divided among those who favored a maximalist approach, 
which involved enforcing all aspects of its version of sharia law, and 
the gradualists, who favored a step-by-step approach.5 c For most 
of the year in which it ruled over Abyan, AQAP pursued more of 
a maximalist approach by introducing the Islamic penal code and 
irregularly enforced a ban on the widely used mild-narcotic qat.d
Most critically, AQAP’s version of sharia law in many cases su-
perseded tribal law, which is relied upon to settle disputes between 
tribal members. This undermined the authority of tribal law and of 
c There is an ongoing debate among AQAP’s relatively diffuse leadership 
about how critical tribal allies are, which also impacts arguments about 
how flexible AQAP should be when it comes to enforcing its understanding 
of sharia and, more broadly, how it governs. AQAP’s current leader, Qasim 
al-Raymi, worked closely with AQAP’s former leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi who 
advocated for a gradualist approach to governance. It is likely that al-Raymi 
shares at least some of al-Wuhayshi’s ideas about how to engage with local 
populations. However, it should also be noted that al-Raymi referred to the 
United States in late 2015 as the ‘primary enemy.’ This view, if still held, will 
have to be balanced against AQAP’s very local battle against the Houthis 
and their allies. Thomas Joscelyn, “AQAP Leader says America is the 
‘Primary Enemy,’” Long War Journal, December 24, 2015.
d Reports from residents of the towns of Jaar and Zinjibar reflect the variance 
of AQAP’s—or Ansar al-Sharia’s—approach to enforcing Islamic law and the 
ban on qat. In some areas under the control of AQAP, all aspects of Islamic 
law were rigorously enforced while in other areas AQAP was more tolerant. 
With qat in particular, AQAP’s willingness to enforce varied over the months 
in which it ruled parts of Abyan. While qat is not as popular in southern 
Yemen as it is in the north, it is still used by a significant percentage of the 
population, and most critically, the trade in qat is the only lucrative source 
of employment in many areas.
tribal leaders who were not prepared to cede authority to men who 
were not from the area, not members of local tribes, and—in some 
cases—were not even Yemeni.e
AQAP also attempted to implement public works programs. 
It refurbished a number of water wells, fixed damaged streets, re-
paired water mains, and, in the early months of its control over the 
governorate, provided limited food aid to the poorest residents—
though always with strings attached.6 f However, as the organization 
came under pressure during the early months of 2012, it became 
far less concerned with meeting the needs of the population it 
claimed to govern. It increasingly targeted tribal figures deemed 
to be non-compliant.
More than anything, AQAP’s harsh approach to governance 
cost it its gains in Abyan and paved the way for a serious—if tem-
porary—defeat. In May 2012, the YAF, supported by elements of 
the United States Armed Forces, launched an offensive that relied 
heavily on tribal militias.7 The support of these militias proved crit-
ical to the defeat of AQAP. Tribal militias provided intelligence on 
AQAP’s positions, movements, weapons caches, and escape routes. 
e In 2011 and 2012, AQAP had a significant number of fighters from Somalia 
and of Somali descent. Coastal Abyan and Aden are home to large numbers 
of Somali refugees and second- and third-generation immigrants from 
Somalia. AQAP’s use of foreign fighters proved to be highly problematic in 
the non-coastal and more ‘tribal’ parts of Abyan. It has been the author’s 
observation that a significant number of Yemenis—especially those living 
in the north and more mountainous areas—are quite racist when it comes 
to Africans. AQAP’s fighters of Somali descent were subject to summary 
execution when caught by tribal militias. Author interviews, various Yemeni 
tribal engagement officers, 2012-2013.
f As conditions deteriorated in Abyan in 2012, AQAP made the provision of 
food and other items dependent on a community’s willingness to provide 
recruits for AQAP. These recruits—most of them forced—were regarded 
by AQAP as unreliable and therefore largely expendable. Thus, they were 
frequently used as decoys and in suicide operations.
HORTON
Yemen (Rowan Technology)
JANUARY 2017      C TC SENTINEL      19
In a period of weeks, AQAP went from a high level of operational 
freedom to fleeing—often on foot—either singly or in small bands.8
AQAP’s defeat did not go unanalyzed by its leadership. In May 
and August of 2012, Nasir al-Wuhayshi, the late leader of AQAP, 
penned two letters to his counterpart in al-Qa`ida in the Islam-
ic Maghreb (AQIM).9 In these letters, al-Wuhayshi claimed that 
AQAP was not defeated but had staged a strategic withdrawal. In 
the same letters, he warned his counterpart to adopt a gradualist 
approach to implementing Islamic law. Al-Wuhayshi also wrote 
that local tribes were AQAP’s most formidable enemies and the 
greatest obstacle to it maintaining control. Some of AQAP’s lead-
ers realized that to be successful, at least over the long-term, they 
must have abiding local support.10 Apart from some coastal areas, 
this support is contingent on successfully engaging with Yemen’s 
tribal leaders. Yet, many of Yemen’s tribes are quite democratic and 
resist top-down authority, especially when those trying to assert 
their authority are outsiders.11
A New Approach to Tribal Engagement
Following AQAP’s expulsion from Abyan and parts of Shabwa in 
2012, many of its members fled to the mountain redoubts of the 
governorate of al-Bayda, where AQAP has long maintained a pres-
ence.12 Since antiquity, this strategic area has been contested be-
cause it is a gateway from the southern coast to Yemen’s central 
highlands. The clans and tribes of al-Bayda are particularly frac-
tious and extractive. The divided nature of its tribes has meant that 
AQAP has had more success penetrating al-Bayda’s tribal matrix 
than elsewhere in Yemen. AQAP and its earlier iterations had tried 
and largely failed to secure the enduring support of cohesive and 
insular tribes in other parts of Yemen, such as the governorates of 
Marib and al-Jawf.13 
Al-Bayda is different. Here, AQAP exploited inter-tribal rivalries 
by leveraging its access to arms, funds, and the military acumen of 
some of its ranking members in exchange for safe havens. In 2012 
and 2013, AQAP inserted itself into one of al-Bayda’s inter-tribal 
feuds by backing Tareq al-Dhahab, a ranking member of the Dha-
hab clan who had been passed over for a leadership position with-
in the locally powerful Qayfa tribe.14 However, the mistake AQAP 
made was backing al-Dhahab in an overt manner and insisting 
that al-Dhahab’s fighters proclaim their loyalty to AQAP. This led 
to al-Dhahab’s defeat by tribal militias backed by the Yemeni Army. 
The Yemeni government, which at that time was still functioning, 
used the threat of airstrikes and, most critically, the promise of in-
creased aid to get local tribes to fight al-Dhahab and his men.15 
It was not until 2014, when AQAP faced a sustained offensive by 
Houthi and allied forces, that it began refining its approach to tribal 
engagement.16 AQAP made a conscious effort to mirror the Houthis’ 
more successful engagement efforts.17 g The Houthis, who have long 
relied on coalition-building among Yemen’s northwest-based tribes, 
do not insist on—and often discourage—overt alliances. Their ap-
proach is pragmatic and strategic.18 They offer arbitration, exper-
tise, weapons, and, most importantly, funds to those tribal leaders 
who agree to fight on their behalf.19
Embracing Gradualism
AQAP’s modified approach to tribal engagement was a victory for 
those among its leaders who pushed for the acceptance of a more 
nuanced strategy. This new strategy, which included promises of 
cash payments in exchange for support, was used in the lead up 
to AQAP’s April 2015 seizure of al-Mukalla, Yemen’s fifth largest 
city. AQAP’s move into al-Mukalla was rapid and appeared to 
come with little warning. The swiftness of the group’s takeover 
of al-Mukalla and much of the southern half of the Hadramawt 
governorate was aided by months of preparation.20 The prepara-
tion consisted of overtures to those tribal leaders and local leaders 
that AQAP deemed to be sympathetic to its cause. In effect, AQAP 
spent months building coalitions with leaders that they identified 
as amenable to its cause and bought off those whom were not with 
promises of money and weapons.21 These efforts laid the ground-
work for the rapid and largely bloodless April takeover of the city. 
The speed of its takeover of al-Mukalla allowed AQAP to seize 
weapons and materiel from nearby Yemeni Army and Central Secu-
rity Force bases. Most importantly, AQAP seized an estimated $100 
million from the al-Mukalla branch of the Yemeni Central Bank.22 
The money, far more than the weapons, was critical to AQAP’s con-
tinued success; it allowed it to expand its recruitment efforts and 
most importantly, to fund its engagement efforts and limited public 
works projects in al-Mukalla.23
While AQAP focused on recruitment, training, and engagement 
efforts across the southern half of Yemen, it left the day-to-day gov-
ernance of al-Mukalla and much of the southern half of Hadramawt 
to local leaders with whom it had established relationships.24 The 
decision to empower local leaders and allow them to govern as prox-
ies is reflective of AQAP’s acceptance of a more covert strategy. This 
strategy is labeled by some within AQAP as the al-yad al-makhfi, or 
invisible hand strategy.25 AQAP also—with some exceptions—large-
ly resisted the temptation to impose the most severe aspects of its 
g AQAP’s renewed focus on tribal engagement is due in part to what it has 
learned from the Houthis, who have built coalitions that cross tribal and 
sectarian divisions. Both groups emphasize engaging with tribal leadership 
as a means to penetrate and sustain a presence within communities. 
AQAP is mirroring the Houthis’ relatively successful attempts to gain 
allies and build ‘coalitions’ of supporters in strategic parts of al-Shabwa, 
al-Bayda, Marib, and Dhamar. They are not observing from afar. Rather, 
in many areas, AQAP is competing directly with the Houthis for the same 
promises of support, access, and information from tribes and clans. In 
places like al-Bayda, tribal leaders routinely play one organization off 
the other in an attempt to extract better terms. AQAP lost a great deal 
of support in al-Bayda during 2014-15 due to its heavy-handed approach 
and its unwillingness to acknowledge the authority of established elders. 
In contrast with AQAP, the Houthi leadership went directly to the elders—
those that were left—and asked them what they wanted and needed 
in exchange for their support. Author interviews, various Yemen-based 
experts and ex-government officials, September-November 2016.
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interpretation of Islamic law in al-Mukalla.h In al-Mukalla, AQAP 
managed to build a measure of goodwill due to this relative restraint 
and its provision of limited public works.26
In April 2016, Saudi- and Emirati-backed pro-government forc-
es retook al-Mukalla. While coalition officials claimed that this was 
a resounding defeat for AQAP, AQAP called its withdrawal from the 
city a strategic retreat that was undertaken to ensure civilian lives 
were not lost. 27 The coalition effort to retake the city resulted in few 
deaths and in little damage to the city. In many respects, AQAP’s 
yearlong occupation of a city of 300,000 validated the benefits of 
gradualism and of the ‘hidden hand’ approach to governance. 
The ‘Hidden Hand’ Strategy
While AQAP has moved its forces from al-Mukalla, thanks to its 
gradualist approach, it still exercises control within the city and over 
the surrounding countryside.28 AQAP anticipated and planned its 
withdrawal from al-Mukalla. Its leadership learned firsthand the 
perils of trying to face down conventional forces backed by air assets 
in 2012. AQAP is also watching the war against the Islamic State in 
Iraq and Syria where conventional forces have inflicted heavy loss-
es on the Islamic State. AQAP’s gradualists clearly favor giving up 
territory rather than exposing the organization to heavy losses that 
would also cost it much of the limited goodwill that it has accrued 
over the last two years. This goodwill is viewed as critical by many 
within AQAP. This view has been further buttressed by the fact that 
the Islamic State in Yemen’s brutal tactics have cost it much of the 
limited support that it once enjoyed.
This control is exercised through the network of informants and 
sympathizers that AQAP built during its year in al-Mukalla. This 
network acts as its eyes and ears in the city as well as its envoys to 
some members of the globally linked Hadrawmi business commu-
nity. The network was designed to function as a stay-behind force 
when AQAP withdrew.29
Enhancing intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities has 
long been a priority for AQAP both as a means to ensure the sur-
h AQAP did publicly execute two men accused of spying and later displayed 
their bodies on planks. Mohammad Mukhashaf, “Al-Qaeda kills two 
Saudi accused of spying for America,” Reuters, June 17, 2015. AQAP is 
also reported to have overseen the stoning of a married woman who was 
accused of adultery. “Al-Qaeda stones woman to death for adultery in 
Yemen,” Middle East Eye, January 4, 2016. See also Gregory Johnsen, “Al-
Qa`ida and the Islamic State Benefit as Yemen War Drags On,” CTC Sentinel 
9:1 (2016).
vival of the organization and as a means to achieve its short- and 
medium-term goals. However, its use of a hidden hand approach 
to governance and influence operations has meant that it has pri-
oritized the vetting, funding, and training of more intelligence and 
counterintelligence cells.30 i AQAP clearly recognizes the value—and 
dangers—of human intelligence in particular. It assigns a high pri-
ority to assassinating members of Yemen’s intelligence services who 
pose a threat to the group.31 AQAP’s prioritization of the formation 
of more intelligence cells aligns with its leadership’s embrace of 
what could be called the long war. It is employing tactics that will 
prevent it from being easily targeted and that allow it to continue 
to act through proxies.
Many of these new intelligence cells are tasked with infiltrating 
tribal militias and other nominally pro-government forces that are 
fighting the Houthis. The members of these AQAP cells—some of 
whom have been recruited from the Yemeni intelligence services—
are charged with identifying ranking individuals who may be sym-
pathetic to AQAP’s cause and then offering financial and military 
aid.j While these efforts are ongoing throughout southern Yemen, 
AQAP is focusing on the strategic frontline areas of Taiz and Ibb as 
well as northern al-Bayda.32 
In these areas, forces opposing the Houthis—especially in Taiz—
are stretched thin and often suffer from shortages of money and 
materiel. As one commander of a militia based in Taiz explained, 
“when you are days, if not hours from being over-run, you do not 
care where the supplies or men come from or what their beliefs 
are so long as they can fight and are fighting the same enemy you 
are.” The commander added, “we can sort out al-Qa`ida after we’ve 
beaten the Houthis.”33
Enmeshment
It is likely that many of the leaders of rebel groups involved in the 
early stages of the uprising against Bashar al Assad’s government 
in Syria thought the same thing as the commander in Taiz—that 
al-Qa`ida can be dealt with after defeating Assad. As is now clear 
in Syria, al-Qa`ida and—to a lesser degree—the Islamic State have 
i Much like Yemen’s civil war, the targeting of AQAP by drones in particular 
has sped up AQAP’s evolution. The drone attacks, some of which have 
successfully targeted AQAP’s leadership, have meant that AQAP has had 
to develop its counterintelligence capabilities and ability to ‘go dark’ in 
order to avoid being targeted. The drones attacks may well be acting as 
a kind of artificial form of ‘natural selection’ whereby those operatives 
who are sloppy and break protocols are killed, leaving behind operatives 
who are more careful and disciplined. The attacks on AQAP’s top and 
mid-tier leadership have also spurred the development of ‘apprenticeship’ 
programs whereby more experienced operatives train their replacements. 
While it is beyond the purview of this article, it should be noted that there 
are parallels with AQAP’s heightened attention to the development of 
intelligence cells and al-Shabaab’s development of its amniyat intelligence 
wing. The amniyat has proved critical to al-Shabaab’s ability to manage 
internal security and to co-opt, most often through violence, leaders among 
Somalia’s clans and sub-clans. Given that AQAP maintains a relationship 
with al-Shabaab, it is likely that the two organizations have exchanged 
notes on the best ways to set up and operate intelligence units.
j Yemen’s two primary intelligence services, the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and the Political Security Bureau (PSB), have a checkered past 
when it comes to making use of militant salafi organizations when 
this is deemed useful to them and of being home to officers who are 
sympathetic to radical ideologies. Michael Knight, “Strengthening Yemeni 
Counterterrorism Forces: Challenges and Political Considerations,” 
Washington Institute, January 6, 2010.
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woven themselves into the very fabric of these groups by leveraging 
their fighting capabilities, their access to weaponry, and their supe-
rior organizational capabilities in exchange for support.34 In effect, 
AQAP, like many of the al-Qa`ida franchises, is undergoing a kind 
of indigenization whereby they identify with—at least on a tactical 
level—the aims of some of those groups fighting the Houthis. There 
is also a sectarian element to the war in Yemen, although this is far 
more limited than in Syria. In Yemen, AQAP readily taps into these 
sectarian tensions and exacerbates them where possible. In fighting 
the Houthis, AQAP’s messaging emphasizes the idea that it is fight-
ing Shi`a apostates that are acting as agents of Iran.
The sectarian tensions and the fragmentary nature of those forc-
es fighting against the Houthis are providing AQAP with ample op-
portunities to enmesh itself within those forces fighting against the 
Houthis.35 k Though it must be noted that AQAP has also targeted 
some pro-government forces, the tempo of these attacks has de-
creased markedly over the last year.l Many of the militias and recon-
stituted units of the Yemeni Army that are loyal to the government 
in exile are poorly trained and poorly equipped. In addition, many 
of these forces are also unwilling and uninterested in fighting the 
Houthis and their allies. This is due to both the Houthis’ reputation 
as formidable fighters and the fact that most of the men who make 
up these units are drawn from the south. As southerners, many of 
them are more interested in southern independence than fighting 
against the northern-based Houthis and for a unified Yemen.36
The Saudi-led coalition has struggled to motivate newly created 
and reconstituted pro-government forces to consistently support 
frontline fighters in fiercely contested areas like Taiz. The failure by 
Saudi- and Emirati-backed forces to consistently support frontline 
fighters has allowed AQAP to fill the void by providing relatively 
well-trained and well-equipped operatives. AQAP views this as an 
opportunity and has enmeshed its fighters among the anti-Houthi 
militias fighting in these areas. In places like Taiz, AQAP maintains 
an overt and covert presence. It has advisers and members of its 
intelligence cells who do not openly identify as AQAP operatives 
serving within anti-Houthi groups. At the same time, AQAP has 
assembled groups of fighters who openly fight under its flag. These 
detachments frequently act as strategic reserves for anti-Houthi mi-
litias fighting in Taiz and parts of Dhale governorate. A commander 
of a pro-government militia in Dhale explained, “they [AQAP] have 
prevented many defeats [of pro-government forces by Houthi-al-
lied forces] and because of that they are winning support. As many 
of my own men know, they pay better and their men never seem to 
run out of ammunition or food. Many of the men who were fight-
ing with us have joined them not because of what they teach but 
because of how they fight and what they pay.”37
In what seems to be another indication of the acceptance of a 
more gradualist approach to achieving its goals, AQAP is focused 
on making itself indispensable to many of the anti-Houthi forces 
k There are a multiplicity of forces fighting against the Houthis and their 
allies. These include reconstituted units of the Yemeni Army, tribal-based 
militias, people’s defense committees, and forces aligned with various 
southern separatist organizations. 
l AQAP offered harsh criticism of the December 10 Islamic State attack on 
Yemeni soldiers at an army base in Aden. “Yemen’s Al-Qaeda distances 
itself from ‘deviant’ IS,” Middle East Online, December 15, 2016.
fighting along the frontlines of Yemen’s civil war. Its ideological and 
religious goals have been made secondary—at least temporarily—to 
its goal of securing local support. This has been reflected by the 
diminished tempo of its attacks on anti-Houthi forces. There are 
few reports in recent months of attacks on anti-Houthi forces in 
frontline areas.
AQAP’s enmeshment within anti-Houthi forces has also allowed 
AQAP to enhance its war fighting capabilities in multiple areas. The 
civil war has acted as a catalyst for AQAP’s understanding of and 
ability to fuse irregular warfare tactics with conventional tactics 
reliant on heavy weaponry. Due to its seizure of stockpiles of weap-
ons in 2015, AQAP now has access to a range of heavy weaponry.38 
It initially had little experience with using such weapons systems, 
but this has changed over the last year as AQAP has fought set piece 
battles against Houthi-allied forces. AQAP, much like the Houthis 
and the Islamic State, has dramatically increased its ability to en-
gage in semi-conventional warfare.39
Looking Forward
Local support is fundamental to AQAP’s ability to sustain itself and 
to its expansion in Yemen. However, such support is, to a great ex-
tent, contingent on AQAP’s willingness to restrain itself and not 
alienate those it seeks to govern. The leadership of AQAP has in-
corporated the lessons learned during its defeats and setbacks in 
2012-2014. This is evidenced by AQAP’s acceptance—at least for 
now—of the gradualist approach advocated for by its late leader, 
al-Wuhayshi, and accepted by, at least to some degree, its current 
leader, al-Raymi. Fighting the long war necessitates patience, time, 
and a far more nuanced approach to engaging Yemen’s tribes and 
the fragmented forces opposing the Houthis and their allies. 
This strategy suggests that AQAP is currently focused on orga-
nizational growth in Yemen. While AQAP’s increasing attention to 
more parochial concerns likely means that it is less concerned with 
direct attacks against foreign targets, its adoption of what is a far 
more pragmatic path to growth should be of great concern to the 
region and the United States.m AQAP’s enmeshment within some 
anti-Houthi forces and its deepening ties with some tribal com-
munities mean that it is even more resilient and harder to combat. 
This combined with the fact that the civil war in Yemen will likely 
continue—at least on a low level—for years means that AQAP’s fu-
ture is more secure than ever.     CTC 
m While AQAP is presently devoting most of its resources and organizational 
energy on fighting the near-enemy in Yemen, it is still advocating attacks on 
the far-enemy. In the November issue of its English language publication, 
Inspire, AQAP continued its call for lone-wolf attacks on Western targets. 
The lone-wolf attacks cost AQAP very little if anything in terms of resources 
and allows them to maintain continue to burnish their ‘jihadi’ credentials. 
The attacks also are less likely to provoke a sustained response by 
Western powers that could cost the group local support. AQAP is arguably 
on a clear trajectory to becoming a far more parochial organization. 
AQAP’s recruitment strategies reflect this. It is more of a purely Yemeni 
organization than ever before. It is very careful not to use Somalis and 
other foreign recruits in sensitive areas. This now applies—though far less 
so—to Saudis as well, given the antipathy to Saudi Arabia in many parts of 
the country (even in those parts under the nominal control of KSA-backed 
forces).
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Armed military-grade drones have been a central tool 
for the United States to counter the threat posed by 
al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State. It is therefore not 
surprising that the West’s use of drones has been a 
subject of intense interest for these groups and their 
supporters online. Indeed, the jihadi community for years 
has sought ways to disrupt and limit the effectiveness of 
armed drones and to deploy its own drones in offensive 
ways. As the United States and other countries begin to 
deploy counter drone solutions to mitigate the jihadis’ 
offensive drone threat, it would be wise to game out 
creative and inexpensive ways to defeat countermeasures 
being deployed by the West so the jihadis’ response 
to those methods can be anticipated and pre-empted. 
I n early October 2016, the Islamic State used an explo-sive-laden drone to kill two Kurdish fighters and injure two French Special Forces soldiers. The group was able to achieve the feat not by some sophisticated technical break-through, but rather through a combination of deception 
(hiding the explosives inside the device) and creativity (detonating 
the device after it had been downed by Kurdish forces and was tak-
en back to their base for inspection).1 This event, and other similar 
incidents involving terrorist use of explosive-carrying drones over 
the past year, has led to a push by the United States and other na-
tions to more rapidly field a plethora of drone countermeasures.a 
These solutions range from drone-disabling guns and small, armed 
attack drones to eagles and electronic and cyber countermeasures.b 
a Many of these drone countermeasure systems have been in production 
for years. For background, see Colin Clark, “New Weapons Spell Death for 
Drones: the Countermeasure Dance,” BreakingDefense.com, October 13, 
2014.  
b Since the early 2000s, the U.S. Department of Defense’s Black 
Dart exercise has served as a venue to test out these various types 
countermeasures. For background, see “Black Dart: The U.S. Military’s 
Countermeasure against Drones,” NBC Nightly News, August 8, 2016. For 
background on the use of eagles to take down commercial drones, see 
Kelsey D. Atherton, “Trained Police Eagles Attack Drones on Command,” 
Popular Science, February 1, 2016.
As these various approaches are pursued, it is worth consider-
ing how groups like the Islamic State are going to respond to the 
deployment of these systems and how they are going to try and 
defeat them.2 
The way the jihadi community has sought previously to counter 
the West’s use of armed drones provides a useful window in this 
regard, as the topic has been a thread of online discussion among 
jihadi organizations and their supporters for years. This article pro-
vides a general overview of those discussions on Arabic language 
jihadi forums, drawing on postings between July 2005 and Decem-
ber 2013 collected by the Combating Terrorism Center, as well as 
other open source material.3 This article specifically outlines the 
creative and resourceful ways that jihadis have sought to counter 
armed military drones since 9/11,c and it does so with the aim of 
providing insight into how the jihadi community might defeat U.S. 
countermeasures against jihadi drones. 
The Jihadis’ Approach     
The mujahidin in Somalia should be careful of the air 
c Due to their popularity when data was collected (2014), attention was 
specifically placed on three forums: Shumukh al-Islam, Al-Fida, and Ansar 
al-Mujahidin. The CTC gathered and cataloged all of the material it could 
find on these three forums that directly referenced or commented on 
drones, unmanned aerial vehicles, remote control planes, or other similar 
search terms during a search it conducted during the early months of 2014. 
This search process yielded 218 drone-related posts that were included 
on the forums between July 2005 and December 2013. The material that 
was recovered as part of this process fell into three categories: 1) official 
publications or statements made by jihadi groups; 2) discussions threads 
or posts submitted by senior forum writers or forum administrators 
(i.e. individuals who manage and run the forum sites and serve as links 
between jihadi organizations and other users of the forums); and 3) posts 
and comments made by forum members, individuals who are believed to 
be jihadi sympathizers. There are a number of problems and limitations 
associated with this approach, and in using the second and third categories 
of forum-derived information specifically. First, while the forums have 
served as an aggregator of jihadi content, it is not clear how representative 
the material posted on the forums is of the broader Sunni jihadi collective. 
Second, since a direct connection usually cannot be made between 
jihadi terrorist groups and the statements made by forum members and 
administrators, the latter category of information functions only as a proxy 
for the views of jihadi terrorist entities themselves. This is not to say that 
the views of administrators and forum members are not useful, but rather 
that researchers should be cautious about making strong conclusions 
about jihadi groups from this material alone. Third, due to concerns over 
surveillance and forums being targeted by government agents as a form of 
collection, forums users typically mask their true identities. Thus, it is not 
possible to establish which forum users are genuine jihadi sympathizers 
and to differentiate them from those who are not. Readers should read 
this article with these caveats in mind. For background on Arabic language 
jihadi forums, see Edna Eraz, Gabriel Weimann, and Aaron Weisburd, “Jihad, 
Crime and the Internet: Content Analysis of Jihadist Forum Discussions,” 
Report Submitted to the National Institute of Justice, October 31, 2011, and 
Mohammed al-Musawi, “Cheering for Osama: How Jihadists Use Internet 
Discussion Forums,” Quillam Foundation, August 2010.
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bombardments and should benefit from the art of gathering 
and dispersion experience, as well as movement, night and 
day transportation, camouflage, and other techniques related 
to war tricks.
—Letter from al-Qa`ida operative Atiyyah Abd al-Rahman to
Mujahidin in Somalia (al-Shabaab)4
The facts prove that the American technology and ad-
vanced systems cannot capture a mujahid if he does not make 
a security violation that will lead them to him. Commitment 
to operational security makes his technological advancement 
a waste. 
—Letter from Usama bin Ladin to Atiyyah5
The two quotes from Atiyyah and bin Ladin above speak to the 
important role countermeasures, counterintelligence, and defen-
sive strategies have played and continue to play in the survival and 
endurance of groups like al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State. They 
reinforce two points. First, the threat to these groups and their al-
lies across the globe from armed drone strikes is real. And second, 
good operational security is not only critical to their survival but 
is also required to counter or nullify the advantages that superior 
U.S. technology affords. To protect themselves and limit the effects 
of drones, writers active on jihadi forums have released tips and 
operational tradecraft guides, which provide recommendations one 
should follow to avoid being targeted by a drone, for their followers. 
To draw upon the collective strength and knowledge of their com-
munity, jihadi forum administrators have also opened the discus-
sion to the masses, as an attempt to crowdsource countermeasures 
and other solutions—and they have been doing so since at least 
2011.6 Cash prizes have even been offered.7        
The approach that the jihadi community has taken to this is-
sue is fairly thorough, as in the discussion threads online one can 
easily see jihadi forum members conduct vulnerability assessments 
of drones. There were examples of different individuals—or small 
groups—trying to find weaknesses in each component, from sensors 
and encryption to spies, that could be exploited to defeat a drone, 
limit its accuracy, or enhance survivability. 
Such investment in countermeasures, is certainly not new as ter-
rorist groups of all persuasions have long sought ways to reduce the 
effectiveness of their adversaries’ actions and to learn from others.8 
As noted by Brian Jackson and his colleagues at RAND,9 counter-
measures, even when successful, usually only have a limited shelf 
life, necessitating consistent focus for any terror group.10 
To make sense of terror counter-technology dynamics, Brian 
Jackson and his colleagues at RAND developed a typology with 
four meta-categories. This typology is useful in that it helps to situ-
ate analytically the countermeasures deployed by terrorist groups. 
The four meta-categories created by RAND include: altering oper-
ational practices, making technological changes or substitutions, 
avoiding the technology, and attacking the technology.11 While a 
terrorist group’s effort to counter drones can usually be placed into 
one of these categories, they are not mutually exclusive. As revealed 
below, sometimes a terror group’s approach is more complex and 
fits into several of them.d   
The solutions proposed by the jihadi community in its online 
marketplace for ideas are best thought of as a spectrum that ranges 
from the silly to the somewhat sophisticated. A jihadi who went by 
the name Abu `Ubayda `Abdullah al-`Adam served as a pioneer 
in this space and added some institutional structure and formality 
to the jihadis’ discussions on the topic. Before his reported death 
in a drone strike in Pakistan during the spring of 2013, U.S. intelli-
gence agencies believed al-`Adam served as al-Qa`ida’s intelligence 
chief.12 He also authored and released a series of “reports”—all iden-
tified by the Terrorism Industry title that they carried—that pro-
vided decentralized advice on operational tradecraft and security 
to anyone perusing the jihadi forums. Several of al-`Adam’s reports 
focused on drone strikes so that the specific practices that contrib-
uted to the strikes could be diagnosed and corrected. What follows 
is a summary, organized along the lines of the RAND typology de-
scribed above, of the countermeasures that al-`Adam and other 
jihadi sympathizers have discussed, recommended, or practiced.     
Altering Operational Practices/Avoiding the 
Technology  
Physical Responses and Efforts to Conceal
One major area of discussion by jihadi forum members online were 
efforts to harden and camouflage facilities. As explained by al-`Ad-
am, “the camouflage is used to mislead [the enemy], and prevent 
[one from] becoming a clear target. For example: The place that 
we use to build VIEDs [Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive De-
vices] should be covered. It is a big mistake to use an open space to 
build VIEDs even if we are doing that here, in Afghanistan, or in a 
secure area [that] cannot be reached by the enemy.”13 He made the 
consequences of not concealing your position clear: “If you do your 
work in an open area, you’ll become an easy and open target for 
the unmanned aerial vehicles and the spying planes.”14 In addition 
to working inside and covering sensitive locations, other jihadis re-
d As noted by RAND in its report, “reflecting this complexity, the four 
strategies are likely better viewed as the extremes of four overlapping 
sets … in which specific counterefforts may draw on one or more of 
the basic strategies in an effort to defeat or circumvent a specific 
defensive technology.” Brian A. Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall: 
Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies (Santa 
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2007), p. 118. 
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sponded to this thread online with more trivial ideas, such as hiding 
under dense trees, burning tires (so that a smokescreen would be 
created), and digging tunnels.15
The most sophisticated concealment measure investigated by 
jihadi forum users online was a line of counter-surveillance clothing 
created by New York City designer Adam Harvey in 2013.16 The 
product that Harvey developed, in which the jihadis took particu-
lar interest in and reposted, were garments made out of material 
that masks and suppresses body heat—material that, as a video 
released on Harvey’s website illustrates, limits the effectiveness of 
forward-looking infrared imaging (FLIR) systems, a key sensor 
drones use for targeting.17 In addition to having an awareness of 
Harvey’s work, jihadi members online also discussed how to create 
homemade remedies, with one user suggesting that sand should 
be sewn between two pieces of clothing to achieve a similar effect.18 
Hardening facilities was an additional area of focus with anoth-
er prominent writer, Abu `Abd al-Rahman al-Qahtani, suggesting 
people should move their offices to the basement of a house, work 
out of caves, or place sand bags on their roofs to limit attrition and 
dampen the blast effects of strikes.19    
Altering Personal Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) to 
Reduce Targeting and Evade Drones
Discussions regarding changes to personal TTPs were predicated 
on a general understanding of the sensors with which most mili-
tary grade drones are equipped. This included jihadi contributors 
having an awareness of high-resolution cameras and thermal im-
aging technology that drones can have on board and the ability of 
these platforms to work as “efficiently at night as they do in the 
day time.”20 There was also an awareness that drones study their 
targets’ movement and pattern of life. As al-`Adam explained in 
Episode 12 of his Terrorism Industry series, “the unmanned aerial 
vehicle (UAV), especially, is able to determine your location and 
watch your movements and there does not need to be a mobile 
phone [in your possession]. The UAV has the ability to precisely 
pinpoint your position via your movements.”21 To address these is-
sues, al-Qahtani suggested common operational security practices 
such as frequently changing travel routines and bed-down locations 
(to include shifting to those far away from areas with known drone 
activity).22 Abdullah al-`Adam, citing the reasons and mistakes that 
led to the assassination of Abu Hamza al-Rabia—an Egyptian  who 
served as al-Qa`ida’s international operations planner before his 
death by drone strike in 2005—recommended that changes also 
be made to the circle around oneself after a failed assassination 
attempt.23 Al-`Adam believed that al-Rabia’s demise was a result 
of him not making these changes after a prior attempt on his life.24 
Not surprisingly, the use of electronic devices to evade drone sur-
veillance and associated strikes was a rich thread of discussion.e It 
was on this topic, perhaps more than any other, that the jihadi com-
munity’s concerns over operational security were most evident.25 
It was also the area where the countermeasures and operational 
tradecraft guidance was the most specific.  
e Another interesting thread of discussion contained conversations about 
the tactical and operational behavior of drones in the area and the apparent 
trends or signs that the jihadis have noticed about their altitude and other 
performance immediately before a strike. For background, see `Abir Sabil5, 
“A Temporary Solution to the UAV: Participate with what you Know,” Ansar 
al-Mujahidin forum, October 2012.
Attacking the Technology
As one might expect, a considerable amount of attention was paid 
to devising ways to attack, disrupt, or sabotage drones and the lo-
gistics chain associated with them. 
Jamming
One particular area of interest for the jihadis was disrupting the sig-
nals that guide and control drones, a practice commonly known as 
‘jamming.’ For this to be accomplished, the actor seeking to disrupt 
a system needs to deploy radio or other electronic measures to in-
terfere with a specific drone’s system, which—if executed properly—
would limit that device’s ability to operate effectively. The jamming 
solutions proposed by jihadi sympathizers online were mostly do-it-
yourself in character and consisted of, for example, using “a regular 
water pump generator… after attaching to it a 30-meter copper 
pipe,” “old pieces of [unspecified] communications equipment, 
because their frequencies are very strong,” or the “Russian-made 
Rascal device.”26 The latter is software that broadcasts “frequencies 
or a band of frequencies to cut off the communications or to jam 
the frequencies that are used to control the drone.”27 More recently, 
in a forum post from November 2015, a participant encouraged Is-
lamic State fighters to use a GPS signal and radio frequency jammer 
called Wave Bubble.28
 
Intercepting Feeds, GPS Spoofing, and Hacking  
Another related area of vulnerability that jihadi forum users fo-
cused on were the data links/feeds that allow drones to commu-
nicate and share data with their controllers. Particular emphasis 
in these discussions was placed on intercepting drone feeds. In 
late 2009, media reports surfaced detailing the ability of Kataib 
Hezbollah, a Shi`a militant group active in Iraq, to intercept data 
from U.S. drones.29 According to these accounts, the Shi`a militants 
intercepted the “feeds by taking advantage of an unprotected com-
munications link in some of the remotely flown planes’ systems.”30 
They did so by using a Russian software program called SkyGrabber 
that was “intended to steal satellite television” and was available for 
purchase for $26 on the internet.31 By creatively repurposing this 
software, Kataib Hezbollah was able to “download real-time video 
feeds from American surveillance drones as they flew over Iraq … 
[which allowed them to] both monitor and evade U.S. operations.”32 
The U.S. military learned of the problem after “they apprehended 
a Shiite militant whose laptop contained files of intercepted drone 
video feeds.”33 Jihadi forum contributors were aware of this soft-
ware, as their posts directly referenced both the software and press 
coverage about its use by insurgents in Iraq.34  
Jihadi forum users also had awareness of successful ‘spoofing’ 
of a small, commercially purchased drone by a team at the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin’s Radionavigation Laboratory, which 
was featured in U.S. media in June 2012. The researchers were 
able to take control of the drone’s GPS navigation system so they 
could fly and direct the device themselves.35 It should be noted that 
military-grade drones, like the Reaper and Predator, are more so-
phisticated, and their feeds have higher levels of encryption than 
commercially available drone variants, making it more difficult for 
an external party to spoof or otherwise send those more advanced 
versions false instructions. Yet, a number of incidents reveal that 
the encryption of military-grade drone feeds is a cat-and-mouse 
game being played out between the United States and its adversar-
ies, as America’s enemies are looking for—and in some cases have 
26       C TC SENTINEL      JANUARY 2017
previously found—ways to gain access to military drone data feeds. 
A number of cases that have been publicized involve Iran and its 
proxies, which is not necessarily surprising as Hezbollah successful-
ly tapped into Israeli drone feeds in 1996, an advantage that led to 
the 1997 massacre of 11 Israeli commandos during a cross-border 
operation in Lebanon.36 (Hezbollah’s ability to gain access to Israel’s 
drone feeds at the time allowed it to gain insights into the facilities 
the Israelis were monitoring. This meant that instead of the Israeli 
targeting operation surprising Hezbollah fighters, they were there 
waiting for it.) In 2011, Iran claimed that it was able to take over 
the GPS system of the United States’ advanced, stealth RQ-Senti-
nel drone while it was conducting a reconnaissance mission near 
Iranian territory.37 The United States has disputed the charge and 
claims that Iran recovered the drone after it crash-landed within 
its borders.38    
Another form of drone takeover can be achieved via hacking. For 
example, in 2013, an enterprising programmer based in the United 
States developed software called SkyJack that allows the user to seek 
“the wireless signal of any other [commercial] drone in the area.”39 
The program then “forcefully disconnects the wireless connection 
of the true owner of the target drone, then authenticates with the 
target drone pretending to be its owner,” which allows the user to 
take control of the drone.40 All that was required to facilitate this 
takeover was “a Parrot AR.Drone 2, a Raspberry Pi, a USB battery, 
an Alfa AWUS036H wireless transmitter, aircrack-ng, node-ar-
drone, node.js, and … SkyJack software.”41 Another researcher has 
developed a way to hack into DSMx, “a widely used remote control 
protocol for operating hobbyist drones, planes, helicopters, cars, 
and boats,” allowing the hijacker to control other nearby drones.42 
Given the jihadis’ interest in counter-drone technologies, it has to 
be assumed that both these tools have caught their attention.    
Homing Beacons, Spies, and Counterintelligence
Discussions on the jihadi forums also centered on attempts to at-
tack and defeat the methods that the jihadis believe link a drone 
missile to its target. The majority of their attention focused on 
learning about homing beacons that transmit electromagnetic or 
infrared signals and local spies who they believe place the beacons 
or use other means to identify which facility or individual should 
be targeted.43 Official jihadi publications have even included pic-
tures of specific beacons that were allegedly recovered from spies 
in Pakistan’s tribal areas.44 To defeat these beacons, al-Qahtani send 
out a request across the forums for additional information on these 
devices and how they work. He specifically wanted to know “the fre-
quency these waves work on” and recommended that people send 
in strategies for how they could be defeated.45   
Jihadi terror groups have also set up, or bolstered, counterintel-
ligence units to root out spies.f These efforts have been accompa-
f Hamas has set up similar units to hunt down Israeli collaborators. See 
Jackson et al., Breaching the Fortress Wall, p. 25; for a comprehensive 
overview of terrorism and counterintelligence, see Blake W. Mobley, 
Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorists Avoid Detection (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 
nied by efforts to share knowledge regarding how spies operate as 
well as practical steps that group members can take to help identi-
fy them or limit their effectiveness. The information being shared 
ranges from the obvious—“anyone who uses communication de-
vises should be secretly tracked”—to the more specific, including 
information aimed at creating awareness about methods used by 
local and state intelligence units to recruit spies.46 For example, 
a significant portion of issue 19 of the Terrorism Industry series 
provides a detailed overview of the method used by the Pakistani 
Army to coerce a local shopkeeper in Waziristan to target a want-
ed individual. According to the report, the Pakistani Army got the 
shopkeeper to act on its behalf through an incremental approach 
that started with an exchange of small favors involving money.47 
This created an environment where the shopkeeper became—even 
if on a small scale—indebted to his recruiter and took actions that 
he might not have otherwise, such as placing a tracking device in a 
militant’s car.48 The sharing of these types of anecdotal stories with 
online jihadi sympathizers is designed to both educate those on the 
forums and to serve as a cautionary tale to deter future spies and 
potential collaborators, as the story told in issue 19 ends with the 
local spy being discovered and killed.49 
Conclusion
Although many of the countermeasures outlined above are ama-
teurish and driven by common sense, they also speak to a certain 
level of focus and commitment by the jihadi community to achieve 
two goals: 1) to understand their adversaries (and their strengths) 
and 2) to be resourceful and work with what they have. A central 
lesson for the United States and its allies, given the cost and time 
associated with the development of drone countermeasures, is that 
efforts should be made—and made early—to defeat the counter-
measures being deployed by the West so the jihadis’ response to 
those methods can be anticipated and pre-empted. 
Two ways to achieve this, if not already being done, would be for 
the United States to integrate such efforts into its annual Black Dart 
drone exercise and to sponsor a competition—accessible by a wide 
range of participants—that rewards the discovery of low-cost and 
practical ways to overcome Western drone defeat devices. Such an 
approach would take a page out of the jihadi playbook and could 
produce interesting revelations about the tools the United States 
plans to deploy in the field, and it could also highlight other drone 
defense gaps that have yet to be considered. To protect any vulner-
abilities, it would be important not to publicize the findings from 
these efforts, as the jihadi community is paying attention to media 
coverage of these types of topics.    
Another major takeaway is that detailed drone countermeasure 
conversations by jihadis online should be mined for useful solutions 
that can be exploited by U.S. forces and their partners in the field. 
The jihadis identification of software like SkyGrabber and other 
similar programs that are more current could prove useful to under-
standing the myriad mix of countermeasures that may be deployed 
to circumvent or fool drone defeat systems.     CTC
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Although global attention toward the Islamic State 
has generally focused on the Middle East, the group is 
finding adherents throughout sub-Saharan Africa as 
well. Three “new” Islamic State affiliates have come to 
the fore: the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, the 
Islamic State in Somalia, and the Islamic State in Somalia, 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. What commonalities do 
these three new Islamic State franchises in Africa have 
with one another? Where do they converge or diverge 
ideologically, operationally, and strategically, and more 
importantly, what might their presence mean in the future?
W hile recent news on the Islamic State centers on the siege of Mosul in Iraq, the group’s ideo-logical hold in sub-Saharan Africa has been quietly growing, and not simply in relation to its well-known merger with Boko Haram. 
Indeed, over the past year-plus, three new Islamic State affiliatesa 
have gained prominence in sub-Saharan Africa. In West Africa, the 
group known as the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS) has 
gained prominence with a string of deadly attacks in September 
and October 2016. Simultaneously, across the continent, in the 
semi-autonomous northern Somali stretch of Puntland, a group 
known as the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS) was recently the first 
Islamic State affiliate to hold territory in that county, while further 
south, another Islamic State affiliate known as the Islamic State 
in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (ISISSKTU) has raised 
a It should be noted that although this article refers to these groups as 
“Islamic State affiliates,” this terminology is used in a colloquial (not 
technical) sense. Indeed, only one group, the Islamic State in Greater 
Sahara, has actually received acknowledgment from Islamic State leaders, 
thus meeting the reciprocal requirements of a true “affiliate.” While the 
other two have pledged bay`a, the fact that Islamic State leaders have 
not accepted them suggests more tenuous links between the two groups. 
Nevertheless, after much consideration, the author believes that “affiliate” 
more accurately captures the relationships between the groups than 
alternatives such as “ally,” “sympathizer,” or “adherent.”
concerns.b
Besides their emergence at broadly similar times, this article ex-
amines the commonalities these three new Islamic State franchises 
in Africa have with one another as well as their convergences and 
divergences at the ideological, operational, and strategic levels. It 
also assesses what their presence could mean in the long-term.
Islamic State in Greater Sahara
The story of ISGS begins with the merging of two other jihadi 
groups: the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MU-
JAO) and the Masked Men Brigade, which created a third group, 
al-Mourabitoun, in August 2013. Under the leadership of Mokhtar 
Belmokhtar—the infamous, one-eyed commander of al-Qa`ida in 
the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)—al-Mourabitoun operated without 
any official affiliation for the first two years after its founding.1 
However, in May 2015—and evidently taken with the pro-Is-
lamic State tide during its brighter times of mid-2015 (the month 
the Islamic State took over both Ramadi in Iraq and Palmyra in 
Syria)—Adnan Abu Walid Sahraoui, then a senior leader within 
al-Mourabitoun, issued a pledge of bay`a to the Islamic State. 
For his part, Belmokhtar rejected that pledge, emphasizing that 
Sahraoui’s bay`a was made as an individual pledge, and not on 
behalf of al-Mourabitoun as a group. An internecine battle within 
al-Mourabitoun ensued between Belmokhtar’s pro-AQIM factionc 
and Sahraoui’s pro-Islamic State faction. Reports suggest that the 
battle may have actually been physical.2 Shortly thereafter, Sahraoui 
and other pro-Islamic State members of al-Mourabitoun defected, 
forming the Islamic State in Mali, which has now become the Is-
lamic State in the Greater Sahara.3 Despite Sahraoui’s defection, 
his group’s May 2015 pledge to the Islamic State went unanswered. 
ISGS seemingly fell dormant. 
However, in late 2016, the group showed itself to be far from 
defunct. In the last quarter of 2016, it carried out three notable 
b Despite the fact that this article refers to these groups as the “Islamic 
State in X,” these nomenclatures are derivatives of Western media and 
analytical practices and not always reflective of the names by which the 
groups refer to themselves. Instead, when referring to themselves, the 
ISGS has previously called itself both “the Greater Sahara Division” and 
“al-Mourabitoun” (though a distinct branch from the Belmokhtar-led, 
al-Qa`ida-affiliated al-Mourabitoun that is contemporarily better known by 
that name); Boko Haram under Shekau has historically referred to itself as 
“Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad,” “Wilayat Gharb Afriqiya,” and 
“Wilayat West Africa;” ISS has referred to itself as “Abnaa ul-Calipha;” and 
the ISISSKTU self-references as “Jahba East Africa.”  
c After Sahraoui’s defection, the shura council of al-Mourabitoun declared 
Belmokhtar the new leader of the group in August 2015. Under his 
leadership, al-Mourabitoun has been firmly allied with al-Qa`ida.
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attacksd near the borders of Burkina Faso, Niger, and Mali. The first 
attack occurred on the nights of September 1-2, 2016, when ISGS 
targeted a gendarmerie in Burkina Faso near the Nigerien border 
and killed two guards. The second occurred about a month later on 
October 12. The group attacked a police outpost in Intoum, Burki-
na Faso, just kilometers from the Mali border, which killed three 
police. The third, and certainly most sophisticated, was ISGS’ or-
chestration of an attempted jailbreak of the high-security Koutou-
kale Prison in Niamey, Niger, on October 17, 2016. Though guards 
ultimately fully repelled the attack—killing one assailant wearing 
a suicide vest—the attempted prison break was important in that 
the prison held suspected Boko Haram affiliates and other suspect-
ed Islamist militants from the Sahara and Sahel. Apart from these 
larger-scale attacks, ISGS has undertaken other criminal activities.e 
It is perhaps no coincidence that just weeks after the third ma-
jor attack, the Islamic State finally acknowledged the bay`a that 
ISGS had pledged nearly 17 months earlier in May 2015. Although 
the Islamic State is no longer in the habit of officially “accepting” 
bayat,f by virtue of the fact that it posted the video of Sahraoui’s 
pledge (which refers to his brigade as “al-Mourabitoun,” though 
d Despite these notable attacks, others have argued that ISGS has, in fact, 
carried out many other attacks without claiming responsibility. “West Africa 
Analysis: Islamic State recognizes ISGS as West African affiliate following 
increased attacks in recent months, despite 17 month silence,” Max 
Security, November 17, 2016.
e The group is believed to have kidnapped and to still be holding a Romanian 
national, abducted by Sahraoui’s contingent in Tambao, Burkina Faso 
in 2015, just before it officially split from Belmokhtar’s contingent of al-
Mourabitoun. Moreover, ISGS seems to understand its area of operation 
to be quite wide, having issued threats, for example, against the United 
Nations in Western Sahara as well as civilians and other targets of the 
Moroccan state. Caleb Weiss, “Islamic State’s Sahara branch claims first 
attack in Burkina Faso,” Long War Journal, September 4, 2016. 
f While the Islamic State has not released any statements declaring that 
it no longer officially accepts bay`a, the last one that it accepted was by 
the group now recognized as Wilayat al-Kavkaz on June 23, 2015, despite 
pledges from other potent Islamic State sympathizers. 
the pro-al-Qa`ida Belmokhtar faction of that group still exists) on 
its Telegram channel on October 30, 2016, it has de facto accepted 
the pledge.4 Yet, despite the Islamic State’s acknowledgement of its 
pledge, ISGS has not been declared an official Islamic State wilayat, 
or province. 
Though the question of why it took so long for the Islamic State 
to acknowledge ISGS’s bay`a has percolated in various outlets, 
three factors are likely at play. First, the newly proven capacity of 
ISGS to carry out deadly attacks, as highlighted by its two notable 
efforts in October 2016, signaled to the Islamic State that ISGS was 
more than just a nominal fighting force. Second, the Islamic State’s 
losses of land in Syria, Iraq, and Libya throughout 2016 have high-
lighted its vulnerabilities. Yet, because of its concomitant need to 
appear viable and expanding, ISGS was likely viewed as a welcome 
addition to forward that illusion. 
Third, the Islamic State’s decision to recognize ISGS was likely 
simultaneously informed by the disarray plaguing its other affili-
ate in the region, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), 
formerly (and to a degree, currently) known as Boko Haram. Since 
coming under the leadership of Abubakr Shekau in 2009, the 
group had always been aligned with al-Qa`ida. Yet, in March 2015, 
Shekau pledged bay`a to the Islamic State, which it accepted, trans-
forming Boko Haram— at least nominally—into the first (and still 
only) sub-Saharan African Islamic State wilaya, known as Wilayat 
West Africa. Yet the marriage remained fraught. Shekau’s inter-
pretation of takfirism, or the justifications by which Muslims can 
rightly be attacked in the orchestration of jihad, conflicted with that 
of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State.g Moreover, 
Shekau’s roguish and erratic demeanor, coupled with his general 
insubordination to al-Baghdadi also caused friction, reciprocated 
g Indeed, although al-Baghdadi has his own interpretation of takfirism 
and has justified the circumstances under which Muslims can be killed, 
Shekau’s less nuanced vision, which broadly fails to offer a clear distinction 
between Christian and Muslim targets, was a point of contention. Freedom 
Ohuoha, “Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko Haram Group,” Al Jazeera Centre for 
Studies, October 27, 2016. 
Screen capture from October 2016 video of Murabitoun’s bay`a to the Islamic State 
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when at least eight letters that Shekau had sent to al-Baghdadi went 
unanswered.5 
In light of these tensions, the Islamic State announced in August 
2016 that Shekau had been replaced by Abu Musab al-Barnawi, 
believed to be the son of Boko Haram’s founder, Mohammed Yusuf. 
For his part, Shekau rejected the change in leadership, asserting 
that he remained in charge of ISWAP/Boko Haram. Though he has 
remained largely silent since then, Shekau recently resurfaced in 
late December 2016, asserting that, contrary to statements from 
the Nigerian government, the group had not been driven from its 
stronghold in the Sambisa Forest.6
Presently, ISWAP has two factions: the al-Barnawi-led faction 
that controls territory in the Lake Chad Basin area in northern Bor-
no state and the Shekau-led faction, which controls land in central 
and southern Borno state, including in the group’s historical strong-
hold of the Sambisa Forest. Since the split, though, distinguishing 
in a refined manner the nature of activities between the two factions 
remains difficult. What is clear, though, is that the Islamic State 
image in West Africa has been both burnished and tarnished. On 
one hand, it has shown itself capable of remaking the contours of 
ISWAP’s leadership. On the other, Shekau’s rejection of the change 
signals that the Islamic State is, in fact, not entirely omnipotent in 
its wilayat.
And yet, despite there being now two other Islamic State affili-
ates in the same broad, though not exact area of operation as ISGS, 
there has been little evidence that either of the ISWAP factions 
(Shekau’s or al-Barnawi’s) has actually had any interaction with 
the Islamic State’s newest faction in the region, ISGS.h Yet, given 
that cooperation between the Islamic State’s wilayat is rare—except 
between Iraq and Syria—the lack of coordination between ISGS 
and ISWAP is perhaps unsurprising. 
The Islamic State in Somalia (Abnaa ul-Calipha)
The second relatively new Islamic State affiliate in sub-Saharan 
Africa is known as the Islamic State in Somalia (ISS). The group, 
which emerged in 2015 when it broke away from al-Shabaab, is 
led by Abdulqadir Mumin. Somali by birth, Mumin spent years in 
Sweden and the United Kingdom, gaining citizenship in the latter, 
where he earned a reputation as an extremist cleric. In 2010, he 
returned to Somalia to fight inside al-Shabaab. Once in Somalia, 
he was sent to the relatively remote northern Puntland region—
distanced from al-Shabaab’s primary area of operation, much fur-
ther south near Mogadishu—in 2012 to attract recruits. When his 
supervisor there, Mohamed Said Atom, surrendered to the Somali 
government in 2014, Mumin took control of the al-Shabaab-affil-
iated outpost.7 
The Mumin-initiated defection leading to ISS began when the 
Islamic State launched a wide-ranging social media campaign 
attempting to convince al-Shabaab to switch allegiances from 
al-Qa`ida to the Islamic State, making overtures to form Wilayat 
Somalia.8 Al-Shabaab leaders angrily refused, especially given that 
dissent in al-Shabaab’s ranks had been brewing for years—partic-
h Despite Shekau’s “ouster,” even his offshoot group seems not to have fully 
renounced its allegiances to the Islamic State. Given that both he and 
al-Barnawi seem to be in broad agreement that al-Baghdadi is the caliph—
even after the split—this indeed signals some potential for reconciliation 
between the two factions. Freedom Ohuoha, “Split in ISIS-Aligned Boko 
Haram Group,” Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, October 27, 2016. 
ularly in 2012 and 2013, under the leadership of Ahmed “Mukhtar 
Abu al-Zubayr” Godane9—and the invitation from the Islamic State 
deepened fissures. In September 2015, Abu Ubaidah, the leader of 
al-Shabaab, sent out an internal memo stating that not only did his 
group reject the Islamic State’s overtures and pledged to remain 
loyal to al-Qa`ida, but it would kill its own members and members 
of the Islamic State if they promoted the split.i
Back in Puntland, and serving as a relatively autonomous al-
Shabaab commander in the Galaga mountains, Mumin began to 
consider himself the commander of a separate entity, despite hav-
ing no battlefield experience. Feeling physically and increasingly 
ideologically distanced from al-Shabaab, Mumin pledged bay`a 
to al-Baghdadi and the Islamic State in October 2015. That same 
month, he began recruiting soldiers in the Galaga hills area, espe-
cially among members of villages who have felt aggrieved by the 
government of Puntland. Though interviews with early defectors 
suggest that Mumin’s pro-Islamic State contingent originally had 
as few as 20 followers, it is now believed that the group has between 
100 and 200 fighters. Importantly, the Islamic State has not offi-
cially acknowledged Mumin’s pledge of bay`a, nor is ISS an official 
wilaya.10
Nevertheless, operationally, ISS has arguably been the most 
powerful of the new Islamic State affiliates in sub-Saharan Africa. 
On October 26, 2016, approximately 50 members of ISS seized the 
port town of Qandala in the Bari region of Puntland, making the 
town the first territory the Islamic State has held inside Somalia. 
This was particularly worrisome as Qandala’s location would have 
given the group port access on the Gulf of Aden and potentially 
afforded it proximity to linkages with Yemen. As of late Decem-
ber 2016, however, Qandala is reported to have completely fallen 
to Somali maritime forces.11 Regardless, ISS’s holding of the town, 
even for a short time, could be interpreted as an important symbolic 
victory for the group.
Beyond simply denying the Puntland Islamic State affiliates 
physical land, security forces inside Puntland are pushing back. A 
court in Puntland sentenced two locals to death for suspected links 
to the group in November 2016,12 and in December 2016, seven of 
its members were killed by Somali forces in the Bari region.13 For its 
part, an African Union-led meeting of security chiefs from around 
East Africa in early December 2016 took seriously the presence of 
the Islamic State in Somalia, noting that it was “aggressively seeking 
to establish its influence ... in northeastern Somalia.”14
The Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and 
Uganda (Jahba East Africa)
The third important, and even newer, Islamic State-affiliated group 
in sub-Saharan Africa is Jahba East Africa, which is also known as 
the Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (ISIS-
SKTU). Like the Islamic State in Somalia, ISISSKTU is a splinter 
i For its part, the al-Shabaab internal security service, known as the amniyat, 
has been known to arrest its members who sympathize with ISS. Moreover, 
a senior official of al-Shabaab in the Middle Juba region of Somalia, who 
was known to be sympathetic to the al-Shabaab/Islamic State merger, 
was ambushed and killed by other al-Shabaab members. See Jason 
Warner, “Choosing Alliances, Creating Fissures: How the Emergence of 
ISIS in Africa Affects the Relationships Between Boko Haram, Al-Shebab, 
and Al-Qaeda,” OE Watch: Foreign News & Perspectives of the Operational 
Environment 6:10 (2016): pp. 54-56. 
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group of al-Shabaab. Jahba East Africa was reportedly initiated 
by Mohamed Abdi Ali,15 a medical intern from Kenya who, along 
with his wife, was subsequently arrested in May 2016 for plotting 
to spread anthrax in Kenya to match the scale of destruction of the 
2013 Westgate Mall attacks.16 As the group’s name suggests, ISIS-
SKTU counts among its ranks citizens from the aforementioned 
countries. Thus, given that the group is composed of East African 
citizens who had previously been part of al-Shabaab, ISISSKTU is 
thought to contain elements of al-Shabaab that were once described 
as that group’s “foreign fighters.” Like the Islamic State, Jahba East 
Africa emerged when fighters previously loyal to al-Shabaab sought 
to realign with the Islamic State. Jahba East Africa pledged bay`a 
to the Islamic State on April 8, 2016.17 To date, al-Baghdadi has not 
yet accepted.
Operationally, Jahba East Africa has proven to be more of an 
ideological threat than a physical one. Its most notable attack was 
on a convoy from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 
in April 2016, registering as the first time that an Islamic State af-
filiate had claimed an attack in Somalia.18 Beyond this, there have 
been scant other claims of violence. Instead, despite the attacks 
from al-Shabaab, Jahba East Africa continues to take a hard line 
against its former parent group, issuing statements such as one in 
July 2016 that claimed:  
“Al-Shabaab has become stubborn, arrogant and refuses to 
accept the Khalifah. Today, Al-Shabaab ONLY jails and kills 
innocent Mujahideen from East Africa. Today, Al-Shabaab is 
weak, and everyday Mujahideen from Kenya, Tanzania and 
Uganda are leaving to join the Khalifah. Today, Al-Shabaab 
is in GREAT crisis.”19 
Finally, before proceeding to comparing the newly created affil-
iates, it should be noted that al-Shabaab’s leader in Kenya, Ahmad 
Iman Ali,20 also pledged bay`a to the Islamic State in September 
2016, though an acknowledgment from the Islamic State has not 
been forthcoming.21 As observers have noted, it is unclear if this 
group will merge with one of the other pre-existing Islamic State 
affiliates in the Horn or attempt to stake its claim as a third Islamic 
State-driven center of power. Thus, counting the two Boko Haram/
Islamic State in West Africa affiliates; the Islamic State in Greater 
Sahara; the Islamic State in Somalia; the Islamic State in Somalia, 
Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda; and now, the Islamic State in Kenya, 
sub-Saharan Africa now boasts at least six pro-Islamic State groups, 
only three of which were detailed in this piece. 
Similarities and Differences between the Affiliates 
How then do these three newer and lesser-known sub-Saharan Af-
rican pro-Islamic State groups compare to one another? All three 
demonstrate some degree of commonality. First, each emerged as 
breakaway groups when the leadership of their predecessor groups 
decided to remain loyal to al-Qa`ida. Moreover, all three groups 
emerged around the same time, in mid-2015, just as the Islamic 
State was exhibiting the height of its power. Third, none of the 
groups are particularly large, nor are they very well-understood.
Yet, there are indeed notable differences between the three Sa-
haran and sub-Saharan African Islamic State affiliates. For one, the 
Islamic State in the Greater Sahara might be thought to be slightly 
more institutionalized than those Islamic State affiliates in the East 
African region. This is the case for two reasons. First, it is the only 
one of the “new” Islamic State affiliates whose bay`a to the Islamic 
State has actually been acknowledged. Second, ISGS is the only one 
of these groups to have carried out multiple attacks. It is import-
ant to recall, however, that the Islamic State in Somalia is the only 
group to have held occupied (i.e. not desert) territory in the form 
of the town of Qandala—even though, as of this writing, it does not 
currently hold it—a fact that might encourage the Islamic State to 
accept its bay`a soon. 
Conclusion
What does the current operational environment suggest for the fu-
ture of these new Islamic State-affiliated groups in Africa? While 
speculative, it could be argued that as the Islamic State’s fortunes 
decline—with the likely fall of Mosul in 2017 and impending attack 
on the Islamic State’s Syrian stronghold of Raqqa—so too might 
these groups’ loyalty to the Islamic State. Two options exist: if the 
Islamic State’s global fortunes decline significantly, the three afore-
mentioned groups could just as easily reestablish an al-Qa`ida al-
legiance, or members could reintegrate themselves back into the 
“parent” group, theoretically leading to a contraction in the num-
ber of Islamist insurgencies on the continent. On the upside, given 
the small number of fighters in each of the three pro-Islamic State 
groups under discussion, there is seemingly little room to splinter 
further, unlike the much larger al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups that 
gave birth to them. 
In light of this, what should we expect to be the nature of inter-
action between Islamic State-affiliated groups and al-Qa`ida-affil-
iated groups on the ground? Answers are mixed depending on the 
region. In the Horn, more conflict between Islamic State-affiliated 
groups and al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups seems likely. First, al-Qa-
`ida-affiliated al-Shabaab is already known to have attacked and 
killed many of its pro-Islamic State defectors. Second, it is not at all 
likely that al-Shabaab leadership will soon reverse course to support 
the Islamic State’s overtures. Conversely, in the Sahara and Sahel, 
antagonism between ISGS and other al-Qa`ida-affiliated groups in 
the Sahara and Sahel seems somewhat less likely given that there 
appears to be little bad blood between Sahouri’s ISGS and its parent 
group, Belmokhtar’s al-Qa`ida-affiliated al-Mourabitoun. More-
over, some analysts have interpreted the openness of Yahya Abu 
el Hamman Okacaha, the leader of al-Qa`ida’s Sahara branch, to-
ward maintaining open lines of communication with Saharoui as 
evidence of potential cooperation between the two groups.22 More 
broadly, as former C.I.A. Director John Brennan has suggested, it 
is potentially the case that the further afield groups move from the 
“heartland” of Syria and Iraq, the more likely that collaboration 
between Islamic State-affiliated groups and al-Qa`ida-affiliated 
groups might be.23
Finally, it is important to remember that despite the outcropping 
of these three “new” Islamic State-affiliated groups, none really ri-
vals the major al-Qa`ida-aligned affiliates on the continent, which 
dominate in terms of number of groups, number of adherents per 
group, and length of time in operational area. Nor do such groups 
present any real challenges to either of the Islamic State-aligned 
Boko Haram factions. Nevertheless, with the uncertain future of 
the Islamic State globally, observers should stay vigilant about the 
current and future activities of these three new Islamic State affili-
ates, whose presence and activities seems likely to grow, at least in 
the short term.     CTC
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